Tapol bulletin no, 85, February 1988 by unknown
The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
T APOL Bulletin No. 85 February 1988 
Renewed attack on World Bank's 
support for transmigration 
Survival International, Friends of the Earth and The 
Ecologist, along with TAPOL, have renewed their criticism 
of World Bank support for Indonesia's transmigration 
programme. In a letter to Barber Conable, president of 
the Bank, on 22 January, they urged the Bank to withhold 
funding for the programme until Indonesia provides 
guarantees that transmigration will be carried out in 
line with Bank policies on the environment, the 
alienation of tribal peoples and the abuse of their right 
to self-determination. 
They al so called for a detailed evaluation of 
Indonesia's policy towards tribal peoples, as part of the 
Bank's Country Environmental Study currently being 
undertaken in Indonesia. 
The four signatories are concerned that transmigration, 
particularly as applied in remote tribal areas, is in 
direct breach of Bank policy because it separates tribal 
people from their cultural identity which is a form of 
extinction known as ethnocide. 
The Bank's Transmigration Sector Review, published in 
October 1986, recognises that the Department of 
Transmigration has "limited capacity to influence 
policies on land compensation, to resolve land disputes, 
to determine qppropriate parallel benefits or to monitor 
treatment of isolated and ethnically distinct people". 
But, as the letter points out, nothing has been . done to 
overcome this deficiency. St i II less is the Department of 
Home Affairs capable of safeguarding Bonk pol icy yet the 
Sector Review recommends that this Department should 
"organise seminars to sensitise provincial staff to the 
special problems of less assimilated people". As the 
letter states, the home affairs department is dominated 
by appointees from the armed forces whose overriding 
concern is 'national security'. 
The letter also focusses on the shifting emphasis in 
the transmigration program me from food crop sites to 
plantation agriculture, notably to PIR (Smallholders 
Nucleus Estate) sites, and quotes WALHI, the Indonesian 
Environmental Forum, as warning that moves "to turn 
transm igrotion sites into mono-culture cash-crop 
production forms could prove to have even worse economic 
and environmental consequences than transmigration" and 
that PIR projects "in areas where there is no history of 
sedentary forming will benefit only the migrants at the 
expence of traditional users and owners" [Environesia, 
Year 1, No. 2, 1987]. 
It calls on the Bank to undertake an immediate review 
of the PIR programme from the social and environmental 
points of view, and urges the suspension of a Bank loan 
of $170 million for a Tree Crop Processing Project due to 
be agreed early this year, until the Indonesian 
government provides proper institutional safeguards to 
protect both local inhabitants and transmigrants. 
The letter draws attention to the forest fires raging 
unchecked particularly in Kalimantan where, according to 
one es ti mate, some two mi II ion hectares had been 
destroyed by October in addition to the 3.6 million ha 
lost in 1982/83, the result primarily of uncontrolled 
logging. By increasing the burden on the fragile ecology, 
tronsm igration has ployed a major contributory role. In 
such circumstances, the promotion of more transmigration 
would seem highly irresponsible. The Bank is therefore 
urged to prevent further m igrotion into Kol imantan so as 
not to compound the environmental problems. * 
The text of this letter to the World Bank is reproduced 
in Occasional Reports No 8. For price and other 
details, please turn to page 11. 
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POLITICS 
The old and the new in Indonesia's 
ruling elite 
A rather heated debate is currently taking place among 
senior military figures in Indonesia, signaling growing 
unease in some circles about the survivability of the 
Suharto regime. While it is obvious that political and 
economic uncertainties provide the basis for this unease, 
none of the protagonists is concerned with the 
restoration of democracy. The point at issue is how to 
safeguard the dwi fungsi or dual function, the doctrine 
of Indonesian militarism, which proclaims the army's 
incontestable right to take charge of defence as well as 
the political and social running of the state, 
The present debate is reminiscent of the controversy 
over military doctrine that flared up in the late 1970s 
which was finally halted with an angry speech by Suharto 
in Pakanbaru in April 1980. On that occasion, Suharto 
ordered the dispute to end and reaffirmed his own line of 
rigid adherence to the dwi fungsi doctrine. Those who had 
expressed dissenting views were removed. The most 
influential dissenting faction was the 'Hankam group' 
most of whom were senior generals in Hankam, the 
Department of Defence and Security, including several 
chiefs-of-staff like General Surono and General Widodo. 
At that time, little was heard in public about the 
debate and it was only after Suharto's crusade against 
some of the dissenters that people began to realise how 
deep the rift had become. That controvery was analysed at 
length in Suharto and His Generals, by David Jenkins 
(Cornel University Press, 1984). 
Fundamentally the controversy centred on the role of 
civilians under the dwi fungsi. Should they be allowed to 
have real influence or be nothing more than gloss, a kind 
of 'window-dressing'? Suharto upheld the 'window-
dressing' view while Hankam group members expressed a 
variety of views more or less favouring the idea of 
giving civilians more scope. 
The Hankam generals were advocates of the 'Turkish 
model' theory of military involvement in state affairs 
which sees the armed forces as a kind of fire brigade 
rushing out as saviours whenever the civilian-led state 
is reduced to chaos. Once order has been restored, the 
military return to their barracks while keeping an eye on 
the civi I ions whom they hove put in power. Pok is ton and 
Turkey can be token as examples of 'Turkish-model' 
militarism though it is evident that their civilian-led 
governments survive only by the grace of the military. 
The Indonesian army's 'Turkish model' wing fell apart 
when several leading exponents were removed from the 
armed forces after the seventies row. Today some of these 
individuals have again emerged, focussing this time on a 
kind of reverse 'Turkish model' aimed at enhancing the 
participation of civilians by 'civilianising' the army 
through universal military conscription or 'militarising' 
civi I ions through notion-wide mi litory training and the 
imposition of strict national discipline on all citizens. 
The chief advocates are four-star General Sumitro and 
Lieutenant-Generals Sayidiman and Hasnon Habib, all 
former senior army officers who are now in retirement. 
The dissenting views 
Unti I he was sacked ofter the student demonstrations in 
January 1974, General Sumitro was second in command in 
the armed forces and concurrently commander of Kopkamtib, 
the notorious body in charge of security. Unlike others 
in the group, Sum itro rejected Suharto's offer of on 
ambassadorship and stuck it out, keeping a low profile as 
a 'civilian' for years before re-emerging as the most 
outspoken protogon i st in the current pub! le debate, using 
the prestige of his former position to the full. 
His most forthright statement came in an article 
[ Kompas.. 11 November 1987] outlining proposals for the 
March 1988 session of the MPR (the upper chamber) which 
wi 11 define the Broad Lines of State Policy and re-
appoint Suharto as the head of state. He put forward a 
number of controversial ideas. First, he suggested that 
the name 'Orde Boru' (New Order) used to identify the 
Suharto years has outlived its usefulness and should be 
repfoced by 'Orde Pembangunan' (Development Order) 
because it is now time for notional reconciliation. 'Orde 
Boru' was born ofter the events of 30 October 1965 and 
ha.s negative overtones, still disliked by many people 
after twenty years. It is time to develop what he calls 
"a healthy democracy". 
He ther turned to the regeneration of the armed forces 
begun in 1983, involving the retirement of 1945 
generation officers (Suharto's generation) and their 
replacement by younger generals who graduated from the 
army academy in the early 1960s. Sumitro, himself of the 
1945 generation, says many of his generation "display 
weaknesses and shortcomings as the result of natural 
ageing {ketuaan a lam i)" and should vacate the positions 
they still hold in the bureaucracy to make way for the 
young. They should however continue to hold crucial posts 
I ike "the national leadership [ie, the presidency1 
leadership of the institutions of democracy [meaning, 
presumably, parliament], the leadership of the Department 
of Defence and Security so as to sof eguard domestic 
political stability, and the Supreme Court chairmanship." 
He then assessed the leadership of the republic since 
1945, arguing that both Sukarno, president for the first 
twenty years, and Suharto hove hod failings as well as 
achievements. (One would need to delve far bock into the 
archives to find any other publicly expressed view 
2 T APOL Bulletin No. 85, February 1988 
imputing shortcomings to Suharto.) But Sum itro chose his 
words carefully. As we prepare for take-off (a favourite 
catchphrase of Suharto's), he says, we need to introduce 
system in al 1 spheres, a "system free from subjective 
influence, o leadership far removed from the domination 
of the personal preferences of the leaders". He also 
called for a clear demarcation between political 
functions and the bureaucracy. A professional bureaucracy 
is needed so as to give the world of business the 
confidence that economic development will continue 
regardless of political changes. 
Here again is a thinly veiled criticism of Suharto's 
style of leadership. Although Sumitro makes no mention of 
civilians in his article, his aim is to give non-military 
participants in the bureaucracy a more structured role. 
Lieutenant-General Sayidiman hos for years been o 
regular contributor to the press but his articles are now 
appearing more frequently than before. A former governor 
of Lemhanas, the National Defence Institute, a military 
think tank, he is seen as one of the few army 
intellectuals. During his stint as ambassador to Japan, 
he was inspired by its technological achievements and 
would like Indonesians to emulate the discipline of the 
Japanese. 
Bes ides writes for the press, he frequent addresses 
seminars. It was at a seminar in October that he launched 
his proposal for a conscript army, deviating sharply from 
the present structure of ABR I (the Indonesian Armed 
Forces) which consists only of carefully selected 
professionals. A chorus of generals lashed out against 
the idea, as if Sayidiman had committed a cardinal sin. 
Conscription would dilute the vanguard role of the army, 
the only entity that "stands above everybody", they 
warned. With conscription, any ragbag could enter the 
hallowed ranks. Minister of Defence General Poniman 
argued more pragmatically that Indonesia can ii 1 afford 
conscription which would mean training hundreds of 
thousands of recruits every year. 
Sayidiman later modified his proposal, saying he was 
keen to see productivity boosted by giving military 
training to larger groups of people, first and foremost 
the work force in the government sector and in private 
enterprise. Now the idea was less about enhancing the 
role of civilians in the armed forces and more about 
boosting the government's writ over people's private 
lives [see the article on "Notional Discipline" in TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 80). But he also came up with the idea of 
creating an army of reservists, composed of people who 
have had three months' military training. This too was 
violmtly attacked. General Poniman compared it to the 
policy of the leftist politician Amir Sjarifuddin, 
minister of defence in the late 1940s, who "created an 
army called the TNl-Masyarakat (the People's TNI) to 
compete with and reject the TNI (Indonesian National 
Army) and its supreme commander, General Sudirman. (This 
was) the army that was later used by the communist party 
in its attempt to seize power in Madiun in 1948", claimed 
Poniman [ Kompas, 24 November 1987). 
But the idea of boosting national discipline is widely 
approved; indeed this is the latest rage in Jakarta, the 
topic of many seminars and conferences and lengthy 
articles in the press. 
The third dissenter is Lieutenant-General Hasnan Habib, 
also something of a highbrow. Following a stint as 
ambassador in Washington following his fall from grace, 
he now serves as a special adviser to B.J. Habibie, 
Minister of Technology and Research and the supremo of 
Indonesia's military-industrial coll'\plex. In the 
seventies, he held a position of immense importance as 
assistant chief-of-staff at the Defence Department, in 
charge of assigning military officers of all ranks to 
jobs in the bureaucracy, the crux of the dwi fungsi. He 
believes it is better for the armed forces and the 
civilians each to run their own affairs. Hasnan Habib was 
one of the speakers who should have addressed a seminar 
that was ordered to close in November for failing to have 
a permit [see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 84, page 13). 
POLITICS 
The idea coming through most strongly in his articles 
is that the armed forces are being modernised and 
professionalised and need to use all their personnel for 
this, which effectively means leaving state affairs to 
the civilians. Civilians should be given more 
opportunities, more facilities to upgrade their skills, 
but above all, they must become more disciplined. 
Genuine democrats should be deeply sceptical about 
these dissenting views. The dissenters are taking 
advantage of openings provided by Suharto and General 
Murdani, the armed forces commander-in-chief, and can 
continue to air their views only so long as Suharto 
al lows them to do so. 
Suharto and his generals 
The dissenters hove yet to make a dent in Suharto's 
position. He knows that certain changes are necessary 
but, as in the past twenty years, he alone will decide on 
the pace of change. In his speech to the troops this year 
on Army Day, 5 October, he too spoke of the need to 
modernise and professionalise the armed forces and 
accepted the necessity to revise some military doctrines. 
But he cautioned that this is a time of economic 
difficulty. He is known to be a slow but steady mover, 
not in the habit of taking unpredictable measures. 
His trusted armed forces commander, Murdani is likely 
to remain in place for some to come; in October this 
year, Suharto granted him a one-year extension of active 
service, postponing retirement that should have occurred 
on his 55th birthday. When the Soldiers Bill (UU 
Projurit) which was discussed in parliament last December 
becomes law, senior officers like Murdani wil 1 be allowed 
to retire at sixty. So he will in fact be able to serve 
till October 1992. 
Suharto shows no sign of slackening the implementation 
of the dwi fungsi. On the contrary, four of the six 
chairmen of parliament and the upper chamber (DPR/MPR) 
ore military, three retired and one, Major-General Saiful 
Sulun, still on active service. Many senior positions in 
the bureaucracy have again been filled with military 
appointees and the recent new batch of provincial 
governors shows no shift to civilians. Indeed, in his 
speech to the troops on 5 October, Suharto reiterated 
that the dwi fungsi role must increase because the armed 
forces "have a particularly important mission to fulfil 
as Indonesia launches into the industrial era". 
Three weeks later, the annual Commanders' Call (Rapim) 
took a decision to amend the infamous doctrine adopted by 
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General Suharto, flanked by the armed 
forces commander-in-chief and all the 
chiefs-of staff, strides to the podium to 
deliver his Army Doy speech. [Kompas, 6 
u.,;,,,,.,,,.,,,,,...........,.....,.......,.....,.......,,......,,......, ............... __ ......,~-----~---................ --~---------------u October 1987] 
the armed forces at its seminar in 1967. This doctrine, 
known by its sanskrit name, Cadek (Catur Dharma Eka 
Karmo, or Four Duties, One Mission) has been the 
foundation of military rule for the past twenty years. 
Reporting to Suharto on the Rapim decisions, Murdani said 
that fundamentals like Dharma Pustaka 1945 (the 'eternal 
values' of 1945), wawasan nusantara (territorial 
management) and ketahanan nasional (national resilience) 
will remain. But as conditions have changed in the past 
twenty years, Cadek needs to be "updated and perfected" 
( Kompos, 25 October 1987]. 
It is understood that pressure to revise Cadek has come 
from the new generation of generals now running the army, 
most of whom graduated from the military academy in the 
ABRI's 
The military seizure of power took place almost a 
generation ago. People who are now in their late teens 
and early twenties did not experience the events of 1965. 
They have only one point of reference - military rule 
which is known in Indonesia as Poncasila democracy. 
Today, a new phenomenon has appeared, the rapidly 
burgeoning political role of the 'offspring of ABRI', the 
sons and daughters of the men in power. Whereas in the 
early seventies they were content to get their kicks from 
the latest fashion in cars or from disco dancing, they 
are now becoming a powerful political force with a 
sizable share in the Indonesian economy. 
The best-known example of 'ABRI offspring' power are 
the sons and daughters of Suharto, Tommy, Sigit and 
Bambang [see TAPOL Bulletifl No 79, February 1987], but 
others like Ponco and Adiguna, the sons of General lbnu 
Sutowo, and Surya Paloh, son of a North Sumatran police 
officer, Doud Poloh, are also members of the new elite 
along with many, many more. What is striking is that, by 
and large, the sons of yesterday's and today's senior 
generals hove not gone in for military careers but have 
chosen instead to enter the business world. Having 
fathers in positions of great influence, their business 
ventures are bound to succeed, with success generally 
measured in terms of access to Cendana, Suharto's private 
residence, or Bina Graha, his presidential office. 
Many of these second-generation power-holders once 
early sixties. It is generally believed that this new 
generation would prefer less of the dwi fungsi so that 
they can get on with being professional soldiers; they 
are not much attracted by posts in local and central 
government. It would not be too far-fetched to suggest 
that people like Sumitro and Sayidiman know this and hope 
to encourage such views. 
Be that as it may, as long as Suharto and Murdani hold 
the reins, it is doubtful whether any civilianisation 
process will occur. At the same time, military 
professionalism means strict obedience to superiors which 
is why there have been no signs of division within the 
ranks of serving officers. Dissent is still confined to 
retired generals who have no direct links to the troops. 
• new wing 
focussed on the ownership of sports teams or pop groups 
but more recently, they have channelled their energies 
into a number of organisations, the FKPPI (Forum 
Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan · Indonesia, or 
Communications Forum for Sons and Daughters of Retired 
Officers), the KNPI (the Indonesian National Youth 
Congress) and the young businessmen's association, HlPMI. 
This is not the first time ABR I offspring have shown 
their organisational muscle. In earlier times, there were 
a number of organisations such as AMD {Angkatan Muda 
Diponegoro) and AMS {Angkatan Muda Siliwangi) which 
operated like little more than street gangs, giving 
support to Golkar during general elections. They were 
directly linked to one or other of the regional military 
commands - AMD with the Diponegoro Division, AMS with tl-e 
Sil iwangi Division. They were recruited from youngsters 
living in army barracks. After the 1983 reorganisation of 
Golkar, when it ceased to be a federation, the importance 
of these organisations diminished. Only one of these 
organisations has maintained an independent existence, 
Pemuda Pancasila or Pancasila Youth, a gangster-type 
organisation. 
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Pancasila (= street-gang) youth 
Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth) was set up in the 
early sixties as one of many ABR I front organisations set 
up to fight the Indonesian communist party. Consisting of 
the offspring of lower-ranking soldiers, it played a 
particularly vicious role in the red drive after October 
1965, joining mobs that raided and looted the homes of 
communist suspects. For many years now, the organisation 
has been run by Yopto Suryo Sumarno, the son of a retired 
general and a notorious figure in the Jakarta underworld. 
He iswidely believed to hove been behind the murder two 
years ago of Dice, a model who had become the mistress of 
one of Suharto's sons-in-law. 
The main activity of this 'youth' association appears 
to be running protection rackets in shopping precincts 
and industrial centres. When gambling casinos were sti 11 
legally operating in the seventies, Pemuda Pancasila 
supplied the security personnel and became a semi-legal 
mafia network. Yapto recently sought nomination as 
chairman of the KNPI, but lost out under pressure from 
leading generals in the government. 
The chairmanship of the KNPI which is the 'sole 
umbrella' for youth, was fiercely contested at the 
organisation's congress in November 1987. Once the ABRl-
associated youth organisation FKPPI entered the fray, the 
outcome was a forgone conclusion. Yapto was forced to 
give way to Didiet Haryadi Pryohutomo, a leading member 
of the FKPPI. 
The FKPPI: 'juniors in battledress' 
FKPPI first started life as a local youth organisation 
in Medan in 1968, set up on the initiative of Suryo 
Poloh, proprietor of the ill-fated daily, .Priorita~. I~ 
officially become the youth wing of the retire? soldiers 
association, Pepabri in 1978. After the adoption of the 
Societies Law (UU Ormas) in 1985 which prohibited 
sectional organisations from being formally associated 
with other social or political organisations, the FKPPI 
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detached itself from the Pepabri and became part of the 
Keluarga Besar ABR I or Extended ABR I Family. This 
consists of ABR I-associated organisations like Pepabri, 
the veterans' association and the various organisations 
of officers' wives. FKPPI members today consist of the 
offspring not only of retired soldiers but of serving 
soldiers as well. 
At its most recent conference in November, its new 
central board included a dazzling array of names. The new 
chairman was Indra Bambang Oetoyo, son of the late 
Lieutenant-General Bambang Oetoyo, army chief-of-staff in 
the 1950s, replacing Djoko Moersito, son of the late 
General Sudjono Humardani, a right-hand man and mystics 
guru of Suharto. The new FKPPI chairman is a member of 
parliament; indeed the organisation proudly boasts that 
eighty-one of its members have seats in the national and 
regional legislative assemblies. Others have been 
appointed as bupati (district heads), while several FKPPI 
members hold senior positions in ABR I itself. One example 
is Lieutenant-General Soegiarto, armed forces chief-of-
staff for social and political affairs, whose father was 
an officer. 
General Benny Murdani told the FKPPI national 
conference in Magelang not "to abandon the fighting 
spirit of your parents". The organisation decided to 
reinforce its links with ABRI by pledging loyalty to 
Sapta Morga, the oath taken by every soldier before 
entering the armed forces. The FKPPI which was hardly 
ever mentioned until recently, has now become one of the 
most prestigious organisations in the country. Its 
advisory council chairman is Bambang Trihatmodjo, the 
second son of Suharto and a leading 'ABRI offspring', 
while Ponco lbnu Sutowo, son of the former president-
di rector of the state oil company, Pertamina, and Cicip 
Sutardjo, currently chairman of HIPMI, the association of 
young business men, are its two vice-chairmen. Ponco's 
younger brother Adiguna is treasurer while people like 
Bambong Rijadi, son of General Yoga Sugomo, chief of 
Bak in, the intelligence coordination body, and Harris Ali 
Moerfi, son of the late General Ali Murtopo, were elected 
members of the board. 
HIPMI: Young businessmen in battledress 
HIPMI (Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia, or Young 
Businessmen's Association) is the fourth organisation 
where the so-called 'loreng-loreng muda' (juniors in 
battle-dress) have taken control. It was set up to 
compete with the dominance of Indonesian Chinese in the 
world of business. For a generation or more, the Javanese 
priyayi (aristocratic class) in senior army positions 
have relied on Chinese businessmen to handle their 
business affairs. But now the offspring of first-
generation ABR I leaders, no doubt encouraged by their 
parents, have sought to transform these business 
alliances and set up businesses of their own, 
establishing a dynastic tradition and consolidating the 
position of leading ABR I families. In the process, ABR I 
fam iii es are becoming the leading social caste in 
Indonesia. 
In the mid-seventies, HIPMI members were satisfied with 
the crumbs of the oil boom, and made their fortunes in 
the construction industry that mushroomed at the time, 
but today they are pushing ahead in many directions, 
grabbing huge chunks of the economy. As a sign of their 
enormous wealth, lbnu Sutowo recently received a hotel 
worth $30 million as a birthday gift from his son Ponco. 
Helped along by the privileges made available to them, 
these ABRI offspring have now emerged as a new and 
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powerful segment of the ABRI Extended Family. They don't 
have m iii tary rank or wear uni form but they hove become 
on integral port of the military who now rule Indonesia. 
As distinct from military castes that hove emerged in 
other countries under military rule, Indonesia hos 
MILITARY PROFILE 
produced a different pattern. Rather than enter the armed 
forces, the sons and daughters (but primarily the sons) 
have opted to enter the world of business under the wing 
of military protection, toking their place as port of the 
ruling elite. * 
New Kostrad chief Adolf Sabala Rajagukguk 
Another East Timor veteran has made it to the top of 
ABR I, tl-e Indonesian armed forces. This time it is 48-
year old Major-General Adolf Saha la Rojagukguk. On 21 
August 1987, o few days after the celebration of 
independence day, he was appointed commander of Kos trod 
(Komando Strategis Angkatan Dorat), the Army Strategic 
Command, one of the most prestigious military posts in 
the country. The present ruler, Suharto, launched his 
military takeover when he was Kostrod commander in 1965, 
and ever since, the post has been reserved for those who 
hove executed many difficult duties and enjoy sound 
credentials including loyalty. 
Rajagukguk's credentials ore indeed excellent and he 
as had all the necessary schooling. He was a 1961 
graduate of the military academy, AMN, was sent to 
Britain in 1972/73 to attend its Army Stoff College. In 
1983, he took the course at Lemhonos, the Notional 
Defence Institute. 
But it was during his lengthy stint in East Timor that 
he attracted the attention of people like General Murdani 
for whom the continuing military operations against 
Fretilin have always been of particular importance. When 
Murdani rose to become commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces in 1983, Rajagukguk's career was assured. 
It is not clear how many years he served in East Timor, 
but his name first oome to our attention as the signatory 
of some of the military documents that were captured by 
Fretilin in 31December1982 [see Budiardjo and Liem, The 
War Against East Timor, ZED Books, 1984]. At the time, 
Rajokgukg.1k was commander of Korem 164 Wira Dharma, the 
sub-regional military command for East Timor. 
But this was near the end of his posting in East Timor 
as by early 1983 another officer was in charge of Korem 
164. Rajogukguk is likely therefore to have been there 
since 1980 or earlier, and to have been in charge of the 
devastating aerial bombardment that forced hundreds -of 
thousands of East Timor down to the coastal plains and 
into the stragetic ham lets that have become the core of 
military strategy in East Timor. 
Yet, whatever Rajagukguk's achievements, this was also 
the time when Fretilin successfully regrouped itself, 
causing new difficulties for the forces of occupation. It 
was his successor, however, Colonel Purwanto who tried to 
pursue a 'hearts and minds' pol icy which included 
initiating negotiations with Fretilin who took the blame 
for the turn of events in East Ti mor. Purwonto hos 
disappeared from the scene, the one East Timor veteran 
whose stint in East Timor appears to hove put an end to 
his military career. 
Before serving in East Timor as an infantry officer, 
Rojogukguk served with combat troops in South Kalimonton 
and was later transferred to North Sulawesi. He is the 
first Botok, the ethnic group from Toponul i in North 
Sumatra, to hove become Kostrod commander but due to his 
many territorial postings, he hos become multilingual in 
regional languages. Particularly his fluent command of 
Javanese hos helped him greatly to communicate with other 
senior officers, most of whom are Javanese. From his name 
Adolf, it is clear that he is o Christian like many 
people from Tapanuli. 
Major-Gena-al Sahala Rajagukguk full of smiles after 
being installed as Kostrad commander 
After serving in East Timor, he returned to North 
Sulawesi, this time as chief-of-staff of the regional 
military command, Kodom Xlll/Merdeka. Not longer 
afterwords, he become commander of the some command. 
Following the re-organisation of the armed forces in 
1984, he went to Lemhonas while functioning as vice-
commonder of Seskood, the Army Stoff and Command School 
in Bandung. The vast majority of officers toking Seskood 
courses hove a period of service in East Timor. 
In 1985, Rojogukguk was drown by General Murdoni to 
armed forces headquarters, to become Assistant for 
Operations. Less than two years later, he was promoted to 
the rank of major-general and took command of the Udoyona 
military command. This commond, with its headquarters in 
Den Posor, Bali covers a vast region east of Java known 
as Nuso Tenggoro, including East Timor. But he did not 
stay long at this post before his new assignment, as 
commander of Kostrad, was announced. 
Kostrod has always been the assembly point of the 
army's best-trained and best-equipped soldiers. As port 
of the recent re-organisation, Kostrad was streamlined 
into two infantry divisions, each of which hos a full 
complement of tanks, field artillery, air-defence units 
plus considerable sea and air power, including marine 
uni ts. The commander of the first of these infantry 
divisions is. concurrently commander of Kopskam Timtim, 
the operational security command which is in overall 
charge of military operations in East Timor. 
It is thought likely that during his stint as Kostrad's 
chief, Rojogukguk will hove the task of beefing up the 
army's rapid deployment force, known as PPRC (Pasukon 
Gerak Reaksi Cepat). * 
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STUDENT PROTESTS I 
Bandung students call for shootings enquiry 
Following the incident in Ujung Pandang last October when 
troops fired and shot demonstrating students who were 
protesting against regulations enforcing the wearing of 
helmets [see TAPOL Bulletil\ No 84, December 19871 a 
delegation representing students of ten higher institutes 
of learning in Bandung made representations to parliament 
in Jakarta and called for an inquiry into the incident. 
According to the For Eastern Economic Review, the 
students rejected the official figure of three dead, 
believing that nine had been killed [ FEE~ 3 December 
1987]. 
Altogether eighty Bandung students took part in the 
demonstration on 16 November. Only six were permitted by 
security guards to enter parliament where they were 
received by deputy-chairman, Major-General Saiful Sulun 
who, until his appointment to parliament last October, 
was military commander of East Java. Soiful Sulun made a 
vicious attempt to browbeat the students. 
The general who became a member of parliament by 
presidential appointment, questioned whether the students 
represented all the students in Bandung. He accused them 
of "committing a violation" because they were conducting 
off-campus activities without their rectors' permission, 
He alleged they were ill-informed about the facts and 
launched into o tirade of abuse against the students in 
Ujung Pandang for unruly behaviour on the streets. "The 
first two casualties were two persons whom the crowd 
forced to take off their helmets," he claimed. "Maybe 
there was o stray bullet. I think it would have been 
inhumane for the armed forces just to gun people down. 
Maybe there were people making use of the situation. 
Whose bullet it was is still being investigated," he 
said, refusing to respond to the demand for an inquiry. 
[ Jowa Pos, 17 November, in Indonesia News Service, No 54] 
A motor-cyclist finds his own solution to the compulsory 
helmet rule ••• and saves himself a lof of money. [Tempo, 
2 January 1988) 
The Minister of Education and Culture, Fu ad Hasan said 
on the other hand that it was "O.K." if the students had 
not reported to their rectors, but he said they should 
have found "respectable" ways of expresssing their views 
[ Jawa Pos, 18 November, in Indonesia News Service, No 54] 
The students submitted a document entitled "Declaration 
of Opinion by the Bandung Family of Students". The full 
text, which was published in Berita Tanah Air, (West 
Berlin), Vlth year, No 2, 7 January, reads as follows: 
Students' declaration 
The way of dealing with the show-of-feeling (aksi unjuk 
rasa)") against helmetisation in Ujung Panjang, involving 
students and other members of the public, on 31 October 
and 2 November 1987, resulted in the death of several 
persons who took part. Prompted by feelings of deep 
anxiety and notwithstanding the background of the 
incident, we feel we should express our opinion on the 
matter. 
Based on the results of a meeting of student bodies in 
Bandung on Friday, 13 November 1987 on the campus of the 
Bandung Institute of Technology, and taking account of 
the aspirations of members of the student community in 
Bandung, we agreed to issue the following statement: 
1. We regret the methods used by the security forces in 
handling the manifestation of aspirations and ideas by 
our fellow-students in Ujung Pondang. These methods were 
not in accord with legal procedures and resulted in lives 
being lost. 
2. We regret that, at a time when the 1988 Session of 
the People's Consultative Assembly is fast approaching, 
when the aspirations of all sections of the community 
should be being heeded, the aspirations of the students 
in Ujung Pandang were dealt with in a hasty and 
") The word 'demonstrasi' for demonstration is never used 
any more in Indonesia. Instead, demonstrations are coiled 
'unjuk raso' or 'show-of-feeling'. 
uncompromising manner, with the result that the show-of-
feeling spread and turned into a riot. 
3. We also regret the statement made by the commander 
of the Central Java Regional Military Command clearly 
insulting the students of Ujung Pondang who are a port of 
the community and of the student community in general. 
4. In view of this, we call on the authorities, in 
particular the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to 
clarify things, to carry out on inquiry into the affair 
and take steps against all those who acted in a high-
handed fashion during that incident. 
We are fully conscious, and take full responsibility 
for the statement we have made, bearing in mind that, as 
port of Indonesian society, we are receiving education 
from that society, and wont to ploy a port in protecting 
democratic life in this country. 
Bandung, 13 November 1987 
Signed by: Bandung Accountancy Academy 
Bandung Institute of Technology 
Indonesian Institute of Technology 
Foreign Languages College 
Bandung Economics College 
Bandung Roya University 
Nusontara Islamic University 
Moranatho Christion University 
Pajajaron (State) University 
Posundon University 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
Trying to criminalise Muslim dissent 
There are currently two sets of Muslim trials under way, 
a series of trials of Jemaah Islam defendants in Cirebon, 
West Java, and a series of trials of NI I (Negara Islam 
Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic State) defendants in 
Jakarta. 'NII' charges are also being made against the 
Cirebon defendants. The names are little more than 
convenient handles, as the charges appear to be very much 
the same. 
Considering that in both places, many more people have 
been identified as 'awaiting trial', both sets of trials 
are likely to continue for many months to come. 
The Cirebon trials 
The defendant Lukman Hakim [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 84, 
December 1987] was sentenced to fourteen years after 
being accused, under the anti-subversion law, of trying 
to establish an Islamic state to replace the State 
doctrine of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution with the 
Qu'ran and Hadith. He was also accused of carrying out a 
series of robberies to raise money for the movement. 
Lukman Hd< im was said to be the NII 'chief-of-staff' in 
West Java. 
While his four-month trial was in progress, it was 
announced that ten more alleged leaders of the Jemaah 
Islam would stand trial. These are collectively referred 
to as the 'Jemaah Islam' trials. 
Lukman's lawyer, Ricky Umar S, later announced that his 
client would not appeal to the high court but would ask 
for presidential clemency (grasi). This meant he was not 
challenging the verdict as such. But Kompas quoted Lukman 
Hakim himself as saying, from his Kosambi prison in 
Cirebon, that he was convinced he had been tried for 
involvement in the NII and not because of any alleged 
involvement in robberies. 
The first four to appear after Lukman was sentenced 
were Dodo Widodo, Asep Jodi, Dal is Burhanudin and Beny 
Achmad, all allegedly involved in a robbery at a gas 
station to raise money for the Jemaah Islam. On 24 
December, they were all found guilty and each sentenced 
to nine years. According to pr~ss reports, they ?11 
accepted their verdicts and had no intention of appealing 
[ Kompas, 2 December 1987 and 4 January 1988]. 
The Jakarta trials 
In all, twelve persons are due to go on trial in 
Jakarta on charges of NII involvement. In former days, 
the term more commonly used to incriminate Muslim 
radicals was the Darul Islam (House of Islam), but the 
authorities have now switched to using NII, making more 
obvious the allegedly subversive nature of the cases as 
being a threat to the Pancasi la state. The 'NII trials' 
are taking place in three courts, the South Jakarta, 
North Jakarta and East Jakarta district courts. 
Bambang Supriyanto, 21 years, a petty trader, was the 
first to appear at the East Jakarta court, accused of 
chauffeuring Imam Bahri, the leader of the movement, to 
various places to give lectures. The defendant admitted 
that he had driven Imam Bahri around but did not see 
anything wrong with that, and denied all the other 
charges. He was sentenced to 7 years. 
Sakfi Suaral Huda, 21, and Sachroni alias Amar Hikmat 
bin Ahas. 40, (mentioned in Bui let in 84 as Syahroni alias 
Mamat Hikmat) were each found guilty and sentenced 
respectively to I ife and to 15 years. Both were accused 
of being responsible for several robberies, on behalf of 
the organisation. As with the Cirebon cases, common 
criminal cases have increasingly been given a Muslim tag. 
Explaining why Sakf i, who during the trial appeared to 
be the less prominent of the two men, received the 
heavier sentence, the judge asserted that his statements 
in court had "comp I icated court proceedings"; Sachroni 
had been given a lighter sentence because he revealed 
Indonesia: Musli111s on trial 
8 
Published by: T APOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
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many facts, making it easier for the trial to proceed. 
In North Jakarta, the first NII trial commenced on 10 
December, with Tjipto Aryono alias Iyon alias Ibnu 
lchsan, 28, in the dock. He is a junior high school 
teacher in Cakung, and lives in Tanjung Priok. The 
charges are that he was trying to set up an Islamic state 
and had given lectures urging people to stand up to the 
government. Tjipto Aryono was also accused of being an 
activist in a youth organisation at the Asshollihin 
mosque on Jalon Wolang Baru, in Tanjung Priok dockland. 
Another defendant is Junemi Adnan, 37, o baker, who 
allegedly entered Malaysia illegally, along with other 
NII members who were wanted by the government. His trial 
is toking place at the South Jakarta district court. He 
is said to have been actively involved in efforts to 
topple the government from 1980 to 1986, when he was 
arrested. His crimes also included officiating marriages 
between members of the group, in violation of the law. 
The prosecution has asked for a 20-year sentence and 
urged that the prisoner be not allowed to do any duties 
outside the prison walls. 
Other alleged members of the same organisation, named 
as Dedy, Bombong and Hermon will al I be tried on similar 
charges, while another named Muliansyah is said to be 'at 
large'. 
Yet another anti-subversion trial commenced in South 
Jakarta on 9 December, with Syahrial Zakaria alias Zaki 
alias Jecky, 28, a senior high school teacher, in the 
MUSLIM TRIALS 
dock. Together with Jumeni Adnon, Adnan Tjipto, Sudjono 
bin Solomun and fifteen others, he was accused of 
attending courses on Aqidoh, Al Furqon and Silah Rosul 
(since when has attending religious courses been outlawed 
as on act of subversion?). The defendant is also said to 
hove been chairman of the Bodon Musyawarah Wilayah 
(Regional Consultative Board) of the Mii. 
In another trial hardly mentioned in the press, 'NII' 
defendant, Sarjono alias Harun, 33, o student, faces a 
possible 20-yeor sentence, if the prosecutor has his way. 
His main crime seems to have been delivering lectures 
which focussed on the need for an Islamic state, in 
accordance with Islamic teachings. But the prosecutor 
added a twist when he said these lectures "could have 
brought disgrace upon the teachings of Islam". 
The trials of two others hove also commenced, but 
little more has been mentioned other than their initials. 
Sources: Merdeka, 12, 24 November, 14, 22 and 31 
December. Jakarta Post, 23 November, 3, 12 and 15 
December, and 8, 11 and 14 January. Suara Pembaruan, 19 
and 23 November, and 11 December. KorflXls, 2 December and 
4 and 16 January. Suara Merdeka, 23 November. Surabaya 
Post, 23 November. * 
WEST PAPUA 
West Papuans appeal against six-year sentences 
Four West Papuans who have each been sentenced to six 
years for activities in support of the Free Papua 
Movement ( OPM) ore to oppea I to the Supreme Court to hove 
their guilty verdicts annulled. The prosecutor hos 
announced that he too wil I appeal In the hope of getting 
stiffer sentences for the men. 
The accused ore being held in Doom Son prison, in the 
western region of West Papua, (now coiled the Indonesian 
province of Irion Jaya). The four men are: 
* Nico Karet, 32 years, an employee of the Solawati sub-
district administration. He was sentenced to six years by 
the Son District Court; this verdict was upheld on appeal 
by the High Court. 
* Adrianus Usyor, 37 years, an employee of the Son Excise 
and Customs Deportment, who was also sentenced to six 
years. His sentence was also upheld on appeal by the High 
Court. 
* Saul Way, 19 years, an employee of Petromer Trend 
Corporation in Sele, who was sentenced initially to three 
years. On appeal to the high court, his sentence was 
increased to six years. 
* lzoac Abisay, 30 years, also on employee of Petromer 
Trend Corporation. His initial sentence was five years 
but this was increased on appeal to six years. 
The four men were tried under the anti-subversion law 
and accused of engaging in activities aimed at bringing 
about the creation of an independent Popuan state 
incorporating what is now the 'province of Irion Joyo'. 
They ore said to hove token port in illegal meetings 
together with members of the OPM on o number of occasions 
in 1983, 1984 and 1986. 
Soul Way hod, according to the indictment, arrived in 
Son as o courier from Jayapura with instructions from 
Markos Victoria, the OPM headquarters, colling on the OPM 
in Son to carry out resistance against the Indonesian 
government and armed forces. 
In passing judgement, the court declared that a 
mitigating factor was that they had all frankly admitted 
their involvement in these activities and had done 
nothing to impede the court proceedings. 
The press report of these appeals, whieh appeared in 
the Jakarta doily, Merdeka, (19 September 19871 provides 
o rare glimpse of anti-subversion trials in West Papua 
which are hardly ever mentioned in the media. The report 
gives only a brief summary of the verdict without 
revealing the arguments of the defence. It is not clear 
whether the four accused had lawyers to assist them. 
If the allegations ore true, it also confirms that the 
OPM is active in the most westerly port of West Papua and 
enjoys the support of people working in government 
offices and private firms. * 
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I WESTPAPUA 
Will Governor Hindom stay or go? 
There are clear signs that the Indonesian administration in Irian Jaya is at a stalemate, following the resignation last 
year of Izaak Hindom as governor and his re-appointment shortly afterwards as 'acting-governor'. The following comment by 
Joh P. Rumbiai< in West Papua Courier, December 1987, helps to shed light on the reasons for the stalemate. 
"During the coming term, the work and responsibilities of 
the governor of Irion Joya wi 11 be heavier than before. 
The job will be much more demanding, mentally and 
physically. This is why I have withdrawn from candidacy 
for the governorship" (Kompas, 27 October 1987). Thus 
spoke Izaak Hindom, the governor of Irion Joya from 1982 
to 1987. 
For political observers who understand the political 
system and situation in Indonesia, news of Hindom's 
resignation did not come as a surprise. Hindom resigned 
after he had been proposed (not elected) by 32 members of 
the regional assembly (DPRD), who were all themselves 
appointees, not elected by the people. 
Hindom's withdrawal raises many questions. Was it his 
personal wish, or did he feel obliged to resigned? Or was 
he forced to resign? The same paper quoted above reported 
a day earlier that Hindom's re-nomination for a second 
term as governor from 1987- 1992 led to protests from the 
Irion Joya community in Java. They criticised the DPRD 
for not finding a more suitable candidate. 
A month earlier, tribal chiefs from Irion Joya went to 
Jakarta to protest to the Minister of the Interior about 
Hindom's re-nomination. They felt that Hindom lacked 
conviction, authority and ability. His slogan, 'Irion 
Java' (Javanised Irion), which he has popularised ever 
since becoming governor in place of Major-General Busiri 
Suryowinoto after his death, has aroused strong criticism 
and protests from many sections of the people in Irion 
Joya. Hindom is seen as wanting to hasten the process of 
obliterating the Melanesian people and culture by 
speeding up the arrival of more transmigrants from Java 
into Irion Jayo, or to call it by its proper name, West 
Papua, part of Melanesia which is located in the South 
Pacific 
Hindom's rejection by Irion Joyan communities in Java 
and in Irion Jayo shows that the people in the territory 
do not Jike him or his policies which have only brought 
disaster for the people of the region. 
Hindom is regarded as the mouthpiece of the Indonesian 
colonial government in Jakarta, al ways advocating 
Indonesia's colonial policies in Irion Joya. They reject 
Hindom or indeed any military officer who might be 
appoi~ted as. governor, but the~ have absolutely no say in 
electing their governor. The right to appo1nt '\a governor 
rests solely with (ret'd) General Suharto and no-one can 
intervene. The regulation granting this absolute right is 
laid down in article 11 of Regulation 10/1974 which 
states: "In appointing a head of region from the 
candidates submitted by the DPRD, the president is not 
bound by the number of votes obtained by the respective 
candidates" [Tempo, 14 September 1985]. 
A strange kind of democracy 
On the strength of this regulation, Suharto has always 
appointed the people he wants as governor, people who ore 
loyal to him and his family, over and above anyone 
favoured and selected by the people. The DPRD can do 
nothing but give their consent and accept Suharto's 
choice. DPRDs are responsible only to the president and 
Governor Izaak Hindom, lndonesianised to the hilt, with a 
group of Papuans who have their own ideas of how to 
dress. [Kompos, 1 March 1987) 
not to the people they are supposed to represent. This is 
indeed a strange kind of democracy, totally different 
from that practised in many ports of the world. 
Indonesian democracy ccn be coiled 'demokrasi menjilat' 
(a 'bum-licking democracy'), a system greatly influenced 
by the culture and life-style of the Javanese. 'Demokrasi 
menjilat' stresses the importance of undying loyalty and 
obedience to the leader, free freom opposition, 
criticism or protest. Such a system of democracy md<es it 
possible for corruption worth thousands of mi 11 ions of 
rupial\5 to thrive, it encourages moral degeneration among 
government officials, military as well as civilian, it 
promotes intrigue, and it ensures that the yawning gap 
between rich and poor in Indonesia gets wider and wider. 
Without a word of protest, criticism or opposition. The 
Indonesian people are oppressed; they are forced to 
accept their fate, good or bad. 
Such a situation has caused stirrings of resistance and 
unrest, which forced Suharto to announce a few years ago 
that steps would be taken to create a clean and 
authoritative government. Who would not be amazed to hear 
such a thing! Indonesia's 'democrasi menjilat' is now so 
deeply entrenched that it has become part of people's 
flesh and bones. This is the kind of democracy that is 
implemented in Irion Joya, also for the nomination of the 
governor. The views and wishes of the people are of no 
consequence; the only thing that matters is the wishes of 
the Indonesian colonial rulers. These wishes will be 
imposed by force if necessary. * 
Irion Joya gets a new deputy-governor 
While confusion was still raging over Hindom's 
resignation followed by his appointment as 'acting 
governor', thus delaying a resolution of the conflict 
over .who should be governor, a new deputy-governor was 
appointed. The former deputy-governor, Brigadier-General 
Soegiyono, had been removed in August 1987 amid rumours 
of bitter conflict between him and Hindom. 
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The new deputy-governor, Colonel Poedjono Pranyoto, 
like his predecessor, is not new to a 'civilian' job. He 
was previously district head (bupati) of Ci lacap, a 
harbour city on the south coast of Central Java which 
must be a difficult place to run with all the smuggling 
and corruption there. It also covers Nusakembangan, the 
prison island where political prisoners were held for 
many years. But Jayapura is likely to be much more of a 
hardship post than Ci lacap! 
At the installation of the new deputy-governor, the 
Interior Minister, General Supardjo Rustam, stressed the 
need for the the deputy and all the staff (who are 
predom iantly Javanese) to collaborate closely with the 
governor. 
Hindom apparently has strong support at the highest 
level to remain in the post, and there are hints that he 
may again be nominated as governor for a second term. He 
has recently spoken out in favour of a new plan to bring 
400,000 Javanese fomil ies into Irion Joya under the 
transm igrotion programme. He supports more intensive 
exploitation of the rainforests, following an 
announcement by the Forestry Minister that logging firms 
(which have visited disaster on the rainforests of 
Kalimantan) should now turn their attention to Irion 
Jayo. There are also plans to turn 1.5 m ii 1 ion hectares 
of land there over to plantation investment. 
But Hindom is not only intensely disliked by Papuans 
for his advocacy of Javanisation. He also has numerous 
conflicts with the Javanese staff who actually run the 
'provincial government'. It would appeat that Supardjo 
Rustam's plea for better collaboration was an attempt to 
resolve these conflicts. Once Colonel Pudjono has settled 
into his new job, the next step may be for H indom to be 
re-appointed as full governor for another five-year term. 
This will leave only the conflict between him and the 
Papuan people to be resolved, which is likely to be a for 
more difficult proposition altogether. * 
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WEST PAPUA 
Land and subversion in Irion Joya 
"Is there any justice for us?" 
"Give us what is ours by right!" 
"Let our sago trees grow!" 
These slogans adorned banners that were corr ied by 
fifteen women from the village of lnjros in the Bay of 
Yotefo, who went to the office of the bupati of Jayapura, 
demanding that their rights to sago stands in Abepura be 
protected [Tifa Irion, 15 October 1987]. They were angry 
because their sago trees located between Acai river and 
Kei camp, Abepura had been cut down by the inhabitants of 
Nafri, with the consent of Albert Sitorus, the comot 
(sub-district chief) of Abepura. 
The women and other inhabitants of lnjros say the sago 
trees are theirs by inheritance and have been their main 
source of staple food for generations. 
Following their protest, the women were all summoned to 
appear before the sub-district chief, the village head of 
Asano, the Abepuro police chief and the military 
commander of Abepura (korami I) to discuss their demand. 
At first, they thought this discussion would investigate 
their claim, but they were soon to be disappointed. They 
were accused of engaging in an act of subversion and 
bluntly told, "You are supporters of the OPM." So much 
for the efforts of a group of simple women to defend 
their rights. * 
Source: West Papua Courier, December 1987. 
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EASTTIMOR 
How monopolies control an Indonesian colony 
The East Timor economy is now being run largely for the 
benefit of a number of Indonesian monopolies, many of 
them owned by generals or members of their families. A 
recent account of the companies now operating in East 
Timor is contained in a document compiled by the 
Clandestine Commission of National Resistance consisting 
of East Timorese Catholic students in Indonesia and East 
Timor. The document reached the Fretilin Office of 
Information in Lisbon last October. 
Taken together with information available from other 
sources about these companies, the report reveals the 
extent to which the country is being run as an Indonesian 
colony. 
While a number of export products are being produced, 
including copra, cummin, sandalwood and cloves, coffee is 
still the prime source of profit. Soon after the 
Indonesian army had gained controlled of the coffee-
growing regions bordering on West Timor, coffee became 
the monopoly of the generals who had led the invasion. 
All military commands - from the sub-regional military 
command (korem) based in Di Ii, down through the kodim s or 
district commands, koramils or sub-district commands to 
the village-based NCOs or babinsas - are employed to 
control the production and movement of coffee on behalf 
of P.T. Denok, the company owned by the leading East 
Timor veteran generals, Benny Murdani, Doding Kalbuadi 
and Sahala Rajagukguk. The compC11y is managed by a group 
of Chinese businessmen, with Hartarto as the director. 
Not long ago, several powerfu I business interests, with 
backing from President Suharto, made bids to penetrate 
the Denok monopoly. According to the Clandestine 
Commission, the businessmen involved in the bid were 
Bakrie Brothers, a company set up in 1951 by Achmad 
Bakrie, Probosutedjo, the president's half-brother, and 
Sigit Suharto, Suharto's eldest son. 
Bakrie Brothers, which was set up in 1951 by an Arab-
Indonesian family, is now run by Abu Rizal (popularly 
known as lcal), a son of one of the company's founding 
fathers. lea! had the good fortune to be a school- mate of 
Sigit Suharto, Suharto's eldest son, and the two men have 
combined their business interests in a number of ways. 
One of the key areas for the Bakrie and Probosutedjo 
enterprises is the export of cash crops; this led them, 
in August 1987, to make bids to control the export of 
East Timer's coffee and clove crops. Deals have now 
apparently been struck according to which Denok, aided by 
the local military commands, will continue to monopolise 
the purchase of the two crops from local Timorese while 
Bakrie and Probosutedjo, each with well-established 
networks in trading centres I ike Singapore, take charge 
of the exporting. Probosutedjo has held the monopoly of 
Indonesia's clove trade since the early 1970s. 
The Denok generals ore hardly likely to have resisted 
these bids; on the contrary, such business tie-ups with 
Suhar to fam i I y interests are bound to strengthen Denok 
politically, as well as extricating it from an up-front 
position in world trading markets. 
Denok's domestic coffee prices have risen, from Rp 600 
a kilo in the late 1970s to Rp. 1,750 in July 1987, 
though prices paid to local producers are always for 
below the selling price in Singapore. Towards the end of 
1987, the price fell to Rp, 1,250, at a time when coffe·e 
was fetching Rp. 5,000 a kilo in Singapore. 
A market in one of East Timor's urban centres. Even 
petty trading is now in the hands of migrants from 
Indonesia. 
The construction monopolies 
In the past few years, there have been huge government 
investments in East Timor. The so-called 'development' 
projects have resulted in several major construction firm 
winning monopolies in certain sectors. P. T. Waskita 
Karya, which mostly relies on orders placed by the 
Department of Public Works, has a monopoly over building 
construction, while bridge building is the monopoly of 
P.T. Hutama Karya. 
Road construction however is the sole responsibility of 
the army's Special Engineers Corps, known as Zeni Zipur. 
This Corps recently completed construction of a road from 
Los Palos to the newly-constructed harbour at Com, on the 
eastern tip of the territory. Although this is being 
presented as a major economic development project, it 
serves mi Ii tary interests. The latest deployment of 
troops from Java, in October 1987, landed at the harbour 
of Com. This is a typical example of the army's 'dual 
function'. Murdani ordered the construction of the 
harbour and the road, in his role as chief of the Central 
Implementation Team for the Development of East Timor; he 
then used troops to bui Id the project, and made use of 
the two facilities for military operations. 
Another company named P.T. Astakona, which was owned by 
MurdC11i, Dading Kalbuadi and Rajagukguk, was badly hit by 
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a corruption scandal. The man in charge was Major Azis, 
an 'intel' (army spy) who, from 1976 to 1982, was a 
senior regional government official as head of the 
agriru ltural office and deputy regional secretary 
(sekwilda). For years, Astakona controlled the allocation 
of cnout a third of the East Timor budget and handled the 
supply of raw materials to the agricultureal sector. 
But rumours about corruption in the company were so 
persistent that Azis was eventually arrested in 1982, 
apparently on the orders of Murdani, and the company has 
since gone into decline. 
Detal ls about the ownership of other companies 
operating in East Timor read like a who's who of the 
m ii itary oligarchy that now runs Indonesia. They include: 
* P. T. Nusa Bhakti, owned by Madame Tien Suharto and run 
by a Javanese director, 
* P.T. Liarbau, owned by Major Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-
law, and deputy commander of a special army unit called 
Brigade 81. Prcnowo is a member of the red-beret Kopassus 
corps. This is the first mention of any business venture 
of his. The director of his company is a Timorese, Abilio 
Osorio, a leading member of Golkar. 
EAST Tl MOR 
* C.V. Amigo, owned by Lieutenant-General Dading Kalbuadi 
and run for him by a Timorese Chinese, Francisco Lay. 
* P.T. Belo and C.V. Morris Deak, both owned by Korem 164 
Wira Dharma, the sub-regional military command in Dili. 
*Three drug stores, of whichApotik Zelia Farma is owned 
by Madame Suharto and Apotik Tosiga is owned by Dading 
Kalbuadi. 
* Several other Java-based companies, the ownership of 
which is still being investigated. 
The overall impression is that al I major projects and 
important sectors of business are in the hands of 
companies owned by members of the oligarchy while smaller 
shops and even market-stalls are run by Indonesian 
migrants who have flooded into the urban centres of East 
Timar. Even the governor, Mario Carrascalao, whose 
loyalty to the Indonesians has never been In doubt, is 
getting worried and often speaks out about the lack of 
jobs and opportunities for Timorese youth. Like the West 
Papuans, the East Timorese are rapidly becoming by-
standers in the 'development' of their own country.* 
Indonesia's im.age problem. 
A recurring theme in Jakarta these days is that Indonesia 
is the victim of distorted reporting and unwarranted 
accusations, variously blamed on the foreign media, 
Amnesty International, PK I 'remnants' who are living 
abroad and even T APOL. 
President Suharto recently urged the national news 
agency, Antara "to neutralise any distorted reports about 
Indonesia by the foreign press". He also told the agency 
to "distribute good and accurate reports", adding: "Every 
news item, regardless of source, should be censored 
carefully before being published'' [Jakarta Post, 11 
December 1987]. 
The former Director-General for Social, Cultural and 
Media Relations at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 
Major-General (ret'd) R. Adenan, (replaced in October 
1987 by Brigadier-General Pieter Damanik who is 
concurrently spokesperson for the armed forces), felt 
that accusations against Indonesia, emanating among 
others from Amnesty, were the result of Indonesia's "lack 
of openness". Indonesia should invite more foreigners in 
positions of influence to see conditions for themselves, 
in the hope they would later correct these distortions. 
Greater use should also be made of foreign journalists 
working in Indonesia [those who are lucky enough not to 
be ordered to leave!] 
The problem is, he said, that Amnesty International, 
one of the many organisations that "persistently condemns 
Indonesia, year in, year out" is highly respected abroad, 
meaning that its attacks could influence the opinions of 
states in the West as well as Japan. 
Ade nan's cal I for "openness" does not of course apply 
to independent observers wishing to investigate 
conditions in East Timor or West Papua, or to examine the 
position of political prisoners under sentence of death 
or stil I serving long pr ion sentences. Jakarta's refusal 
to allow a host of organisations to send missions of 
investigation does much to blacken the regime's image, 
revealing how much it needs to hide from outside 
scrutiny. 
IPU resolution infuriates Jakarta 
It has just been revealed in the Indonesian press that 
the conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held in 
Bangkok last October adopted a resolution on the question 
of East Timor, despite efforts by the Indonesian 
delegation to oppose any discussion of the question. The 
resolution calls on Indonesia and Portugal to collaborate 
with the UN Secretary-General in seeking a solution to 
the East Timor question. 
According to the head of Indonesia's delegation, the 
move to have a resolution on East Ti mor came after the 
Portuguese delegation, in a speech to the plenary 
session, called on Indonesia to get out of East Timor. 
Initially there was no draft resolution but following 
Portugal's intervention, the Angolan delegation proposed 
a text to the drafting committee. The Indonesian 
delegation opposed this but Cuba supported Angola while 
Algeria and four other countries abstained [Pikiran 
Rakyat, 14 December 1987]. 
What the Indonesian delegation did not reveal was that 
the resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by 791 votes to 
122, with 207 abstentions. 
-
-
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Pope concerned about East Timor 
A brief but pointed reference to East Timor mode by Pope 
John Poul II when accepting the credentials of the new 
Indonesian ombossaoor in December hos sent shock-waves 
through the government in Jakarta. 
He said: "The Church's universal mission of service 
leads her to hope that particular consideration will be 
given to the protection of the ethnic, religious and 
cultural character of the people of East Timor" [UCA 
News, 23 December 1 987), These words were al most 
identical with the remark the Pope mode when accepting 
the credentials of the previous Indonesian ambassador 
three years ago. 
[Apart from the English- laiguoge Jakarta Post, only one 
Indonesian paper, Suora Pembaruan, reported the Pope's 
remarks, but not till two weeks afterwords, on 29 
December. This kind of news is apparently deemed 
unsuitable for Indonesians to read.] 
Foreign Minister Mochtor Kusumootmodja responded by 
colling a press conference at which he accused the Pope 
of being "misinformed" and "one-sided". It was all the 
fault of the foreign media. According to Mochtar, the 
fact that the number of Catholics in East Timor has 
increased since the start of Indonesian rule ought to win 
the Pope's commendation. [Such a claim is disingenuous; 
it is the terror and intim idotion suffered under 
Indonesian occupation that hos driven tens of thousands 
of non-Catholics to seek protection in the Church.] 
Mochtor mode no secret of his bitterness that the Pope 
hos by-passed Indonesia in recent tours to other 
countries in the region. 
Frans Seda, Pontifical Commission member, 
defends Indonesia's record 
Other statements fol lowed hard on Mochtar's press 
conference, in an attempt to defend integration and 
deflate the harmful impact of Pope John Paul's message. 
Frans Seda, o senior figure in the Indonesian Catholic 
community, complained that ''not only the Pope but most- of 
Children at school in Maliana, in western East Timor. A 
typical scene in any Pancasila centre of education. 
[Kompos, 6 January 1988 j 
the outside world is still inadequately informed about 
developments in East Timor'' [Jakarta Post, 18 December]. 
Seda is a member of the Vatican's Pontifical Commission 
on Justice and Peace. He attended the Synod of Bishops in 
the Vatican last autumn as a lay auditor and met the Pope 
during that visit. 
He must be wondering why his own efforts to disseminate 
information about East Timor under Indonesian rule among 
Cothol ic peace and justice commissions hove been so 
unsuccessful. In a paper on East Timor presented to the 
General Assembly of the Pontifical Commission in November 
I 985, Seda complained about "excessive, unproper, 
negative international press-coverage" (original, Engl.). 
Admitting that there hove been killings, political 
imprisonment even torture and sufferings, he went on: 
"(This is) because there was a war. In a war there ore 
two parties involved. In the international, especially 
Cot ho Ii c coverages, only Indonesia is accused" (page 5). 
Where does the Pope's information 
come from? 
The Catholic Church in East Timor is still directly 
administered by the Vatican, despite efforts by Indonesia 
to have it incorporated into the Indonesian Church. The 
point was reiterated by the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta, Mgr 
Francesco Canclini, who declared recently that as long as 
the international dispute over East Timor's status is 
unresolved, the Vatican cannot transfer the East Ti mor 
Church to its Asia deportment "as this would imply 
recognising the Indonesian dimension". The Vatican con 
only act in accordance with international low and "cannot 
pre-empt" any decisions token on the matter [Suora 
Pembaruan, 21 September 1987). 
Mgr Canclini also praised Indonesia's "development 
efforts" in East Timor. He recalled that the Vatican had 
in ~he post expressed concern about human rights but 
claimed, ofter some hesitation, that things hod now 
improved. Yet however pl eos i ng these words may hove 
sounded in Jakarta, the Vatican's refusal to recognise 
Indonesia's annexation of East Timor is galling in the 
extreme, not least because it enables the Vatican to keep 
open direct lines of communication with Church personnel 
working in East Timor. 
East Timor Church pleads for 
freedom of movement 
The Vatican is certain to be aware of a document 
summarising a submission made by a senior Jesuit, P.J. 
Dijkstra, on behalf of Mgr Belo, head of the Catholic 
Church in East Timor to MASRI, the Counci I of Indonesian 
Religious Superiors, at its meeting lost August. The 
document summarising the submission and the discussion 
which followed, presented Mgr Belo's views on the 
political situation in East Timor in the following bleak 
terms: 
"Since East Timor's integration into Indonesia 
major and rapid changes have taken place in th~ 
economic and social-cultural systems of society. The 
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most prominent social change is the shift away from 
the domination of religion and religious leaders who 
originally hod a decisive influence in the community. 
The fact is that now another religion is growing 
alongside the changes that ore taking place, and the 
influence of religious leaders long established in 
society has gradually been dissipated (memudar). 
"There is a change in attitude of state officials 
towards society, whilst for its part, the community 
does not yet hove the courage openly to articulate its 
opinions and wishes to the government or to Church 
leaders, oil of which makes life increasing oppressive 
(mencekam). 
"Certain officials do not take account of conditions 
in the area and behave in a disreputable manner; some 
pursue pri vote missions all of which offends and hurts 
the community." 
The document makes a plea for freedom of movement for 
Catholic pastors, brothers, sisters and lay-people in the 
performance of their pastoral activities, so as to enable 
the Church to play its role in resolving problems and 
restoring a sense of peace. It hopes that the local 
government apparatus will beollov..ed to function smoothly 
and soundly. 
The document conveys a sense of urgency about the 
Church's need for rnore personnel. It states that 34 
Muslim preachers coming direct from Saudi Arabia and 
graduates of the state Islamic university, IAIN, ore soon 
to be permanently located in East Timor, with more to 
follow. 
Considering the caution invariably used in Catholic 
discourse, these words reveal profound disquiet within 
the Church in East Timor and probably go a long way to 
explaining the concern conveyed in the Pope's message. 
The impending influx of Musi i m teachers and preachers 
signifies a possible move by the regime to dilute the 
role of Cothol icism in East Timor, in the special 
circumstances of a persecuted population for whom the 
EASTTIMOR 
Church hos become the sole institution affording 
protection to Timorese living in those parts of East 
Timor under Indonesian occupation against the brutalities 
committed by the forces of occupation. 
Jesuit Superior-General countermands the 
Indonesian Provincial 
Father P. Felgueiros, the rector of the Seminary in 
Dili, whose return to East Timor hod been blocked after 
visiting his family in Portugal lost year hos now been 
authorised to return to Di Ii although whether he will 
resume his duties as rector is not clear. 
Although no-one in Indonesia would take responsibility 
for preventing Father Felgueiras' return, the Lisbon 
doily, Diorio de Noticias reports that the decision was 
reversed by Father Kolvenboch, the Superior-General of 
the Society of Jesus in Rome. This suggests that the 
attempt to block his return came from the Indonesian 
Jesuits. 
The Superior-General also reversed on earlier decision 
which had placed Jesuits working in East Timor under the 
supervision of Indonesian Jesuits; they have now been 
restored to the supervision of the Sor.:iety of Jesus in 
Portugal [Em Timor-Leste a Paz e Possivel, No 23, Jan-Feb 
1988). The earlier decision was seen as implying support 
for 'integration'. The reversal is a clear defeat for 
Indonesian policy. 
Father Felgueiras will go to Rome in April to present 
his case and that of Jesuits in East Timor to the Curia 
General [Diorio de Noticios, 28 October 1987). * 
Murdani's latest assessm.ent of Fretilin 
General Benny Murdoni, commander-in-chief of the 
Indonesian armed forces, has publicly acknowledged that 
it will still take years to end armed resistance to 
Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. But he said he 
thought that "only around five hundred Fretilin fighters" 
are still operating in East Timor as compared with 10,000 
some years ago and dismissed Fretilin as having no impact 
apart fromn "attacking the population, burning crops and 
stealing cattle" [Kompos, 31 December 1987). 
He said most were armed but with outmoded weapons 
though they were also armed with weapons seized from 
Indonesian troops. He strongly denied that East Timor was 
on Indonesian colony; in so doing he revealed how much he 
resents Indonesia being called a colonial power. 
Asked about Fretilin's international links, Murdani 
said their radio has not functioned for a year and 
insisted that no supplies were reaching them from abroad 
[Merdeko, 31 December 1987). 
It is instructive to compare Murdani's latest 
assessment with an assessment he mode in December 1 984, 
when he claimed that Fret ii in had between 500 and 700 
fighters under arms. He said then that Indonesia had 
opted to pursue a "hearts and minds policy" which "is not 
something you can achieve in one or two years" [Reuters, 
17 December 1984]. Now, three years on, even according to 
official claims, the challenge from Fretilin has hardly 
changed. 
This latest statement shows Murdoni on the defensive, 
not even trying to explain why a few hundred guerrillas 
(if his figures are to be believed) can hold down tens of 
thousands of Indonesian troops for years. It seems the 
purpose of the statement was to warn government leaders 
not to expect miracles. 
By contrast, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja tries to present 
the East Timor issue in a much more positive light. In 
A recent photo from East Timor of guerrillas in the bush, 
some of Murdoni's -Five hundred fighters". 
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his end-of-year foreign affairs report, Mochtar said the 
fact that the issue had not been voted on at the UN for 
the fifth year running "shows that international interest 
is flagging." Jakarta Post [5 January], and welcomed this 
as a "diplomatic boom". Even so, vigilance was necessary 
because "anti-Indonesian elements are always using every 
opportunity to raise the issue internationally." [Kompas, 
5 January 1988] 
Intelligence report 
Murdani's downbeat report probably has its origins in 
an intelligence report compiled a few months earlier 
about attitudes of the Timorese people. According to a 
document dated 2 October and sent to the Fretilin 
Information Office (GIF} in Lisbon by the Clandestine 
Commission of Resistance of Catholic Timorese Students in 
Indonesia and East Ti mor, Murdoni's Strategic 
intelligence agency, SAIS (Badon Inteligen Strategis} and 
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
carried out on investigation of Timorese attitudes during 
the first eight months of 1987 and reported that the East 
Timorese people "totally reject" Indonesia's presence in 
East Timor. Students even speak out openly and fearlessly 
against Indonesia. According to the Clandestine 
Commission's contacts in Jakarta, Murdani was greatly 
discouraged by the intelligence report which convinced 
him of the need to persuade the Timorese that Indonesia 
is the only power that can guarantee freedom, not 
Portugal or Fretilin or the UDT. 
Murdoni spends Christmas in East Timor 
In accordance with well-established ritual, Murdani 
went to East Timor for Christmas and used his v.isit to 
make yet another appeal "to those still wandering in the 
forests and mountains" to stop resisting Indonesia and 
come down" [Jakarta Post, 28 December]. 
Murdani is responsible both for military operations and 
'development' activities in East Timar. The Security 
Operations Command for East Timor (Kopskam Timtim) is 
directly accountable to the armed forces central command 
under Murdoni; he is also chairman of the Team Pelaksana 
Pembangunan Pusat Timor Timur, or Central Implementation 
Team for the Development of East Timor. More than anyone 
else, his political reputation is closely tied to the 
success or failure of Indonesian policies in East Timor. 
I II Corrascaloo: Integration "on paper on Y 
Soon after Murdani had spoken, Mario Carrascalao, the 
governor of East Timor, who was recently con!irmed by 
Suharto as governor for a second term, made 1 ~1s end-?f-year comment. He actually admitted that. integratlo~, 
exists on paper ... but it still has to ~e given .content 
("diatas kertas, integrasi sudah selesa1 ... tetap1 dalam 
kenyatoannya harus mampu mengisinyo"}, and spoke about a 
project of his "to change the attitudes of both the 
Timorese and the newcomers". 
To give his words an optimistic ri~g, ~e said he. looked 
forward to tourism becoming a ma1or industry tn East 
Timor, but admitted that access to the territory was not 
free ('terkontrol'} and people abroad could not 
understand why. "Our potentials are fine. All that 
remains is for the region to be opened up. But when?" He 
did not attempt to give an onswer.l Kompas, 31 December]. 
Khmer Rouge expert now US 
consul in Jakarta 
The US consul in Jakarta, Tim Carney, has been 
identified by Indonesia News Service as an "acknowledged 
scholar on the Khmer Rouge" [INS, No. 40, 17 October 
1987]. During a working visit to Central Java, Carney 
slipped out a remark that he consider development in East 
Timor to be proceeding smoothly [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 3 
October 1987]. This suggests that Carney may hold the 
reporting brief on East Timor in the US Jakarta embassy 
which would be on interesting clue to the importance 
Washington attaches to obtaining its own assessment of 
Fretilin. * 
Indonesia to get seat on UN human rights sub-commission? 
Indonesia is making a bid to win a place on the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrim inotion and Protection 
of Minorities. The sub-commission, which is composed of 
experts in human right affairs who should operate 
independently of their governments, is the body which 
considers and prepares the agenda of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights. Some members of the sub-commission w ii 1 
come up for re-election at the Commission meeting in 
Geneva in February this year, on opportunity Jakarta 
hopes to use to turn the whole UN human rights apparatus 
into a mockery. 
Indonesia's candidate for the post is Yusuf Wanandi, 
director of the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, the body responsible for supervising all 
international visits to East Timor. The CSlS has been 
involved in the annexation of East Timar since the very 
start and assists the armed forces command in numerous 
ways to counter-act international pressure for an act of 
self-determination in East Timar. 
Jakarta is clearly rattled by the sub-commission's 
resolution lost August recommending that this year's 
Commission should again investigate human rights abuse in 
East Timor. As a sub-commission member, Wanondi's primary 
task wil 1 be to sabotage any moves to protect any of the 
the victims of the Indonesian military regime. * 
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UDT leader speaks to TAPOL 
Dr Moises do Amaral isaleaderofthe Timorese Democratic Union (UD T} in exile. He was the UD T signatory of an histori c 
document, the National Convergence between Fretilin andthe UD T, which was signed in March 1986 in Lisbon. The document 
is available from TAPDL in Occasional Reports Na. 2. 
Dr do Amaral was a member of the U D T delegation that attended the meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee in August 
this year to petition on behalf of the people of East Ti mor. The following interview of Dr do Amaral took. place in Lisbon 
in September 1987. 
Could you say something about your own background? 
I was born in the mountains in the south-eastern port of 
East Timer and was educated ofter the Second World War in 
Soibodo, then I studied at the seminary in Dare from 1954 
re 1959. l went to Macao where 1 studied theology up to 
the fifth year, after which 1 returned to East Timor to 
do my military service. 
I was sent to Lisbon to train as an officer. I was sent 
to Mozambique as a lieutenant, in command of thirty men. 
After my m iii tary service, I entered government service 
in Mozambique and worked there for six years, from 1969 
till 1974. But in 1973, I entered university to study 
history, as a working student. I did the first year of my 
studies in Mozambique and in 1974, l went to Lisbon to 
continue my studies there, graduating in 1978. Since then 
I have worked as a teacher in Lisbon. I have all the time 
Moises do Amaral, UDT, 
in spectacles, with 
Vincente Gutteres, 
also from the UDT. 
been involved in political and social organisations to 
grapple with the political and social problems of my 
people. I hove always felt this was important. In 1976, 
about three thousand East Timorese come to Portugal as 
refugees, and in 1979, another batch arrived. I asked 
several countries to receive East Timorese refugees, but 
only Australia agreed. More than 4,000 went to Australia. 
As you see, I was not in East Timer at the time of the 
Indonesian invasion. This was because, when I left my 
country, I pledged that I would not return until I had 
obtained a good qualification. 
Did you keep in touch with your family oil that time? 
After the invasion, I got in touch with the Red Cross 
in Portugal and the International Red Cross in Geneva for 
information, but it wasn't until 1979 that I heard 
anything. 
My parents hod twelve children, of whom three died many 
years ago. Of the nine surviving brothers and sisters 
(including myself), I discovered that five died following 
the invasion so there were only three left apart from me, 
a sister in East Timor, a sister in Australia and a 
brother in East Timor. Also, only six nephews have 
survived. I also lost two half-brothers and many nephews 
and nieces. 
Do you know how they died? 
I know that my father died of starvation. I also know 
that my youngest brother was killed together with his 
wife. My mother also died because of the famine. A 
younger sister died because she refused to surrender to 
the Indonesian soldiers. She was only 22. Her name was 
Teresa. Two other brothers wanted to surrender but when 
she refused to surrender, they refused as wel I. 
As for my father, he became weak and hungry. So he 
decided to try and reach a village to ask for help. He 
hod one of his grand-daughters with him. But he did not 
have the strength to finish the journey so he sat down on 
a stone and they both died, there by the road. That was 
in 1978. After that, my brother surrendered in 1979, and 
then he was k i lied. 
Some of my relatives hod been fighting. Our region was 
inhabited by many thousands of people. Some of them later 
come to Portugal. They can testify about what happened. 
In 1976 and 1977, my brother took in many people who had 
fled from their homes when the Indonesians came. 
What about the fate of your clan? Do you have any 
information? 
In Portuguese times, the authorities carried out a 
census every two or three years. At the last census 
before the invasion, my clan consisted of almost six 
hundred persons, and there were about two thousand five 
hundred people in our tribe, the Fatuberl iu tribe. My 
father was a liurai {clan chief). 
Almost the entire clan has been wiped out. Only a few 
dozen people have survived. Some are living in Same and 
some in Dili. But many other clans from Fatuberliu have 
also completely disappeared. l think the reason for the 
heavy death-toll is that in the early years of the 
occupation, from 1976 to 1979, many people from other 
ports of the country fled to this region and took refuge 
there. Because of this, the Indonesians regarded our clan 
as highly suspect, people who should all be wiped out. 
The region was also heavi 1 y bombed in the years up to 
1979, so by 1980, there was almost no-one left . At that 
time, l asked the Red Cross if they could trace any of my 
relatives. They were not able to, and it was only later, 
when people from the region arrived in Portugal that I 
heard what had happened. 
What a terrible tragedy for you! When did you join the 
UDT? 
1 joined in 1974. After the Indonesian invasion, I 
continued to fight with my party for the East Timorese 
people. 
The Indonesians say the UDT was one of the parties that 
petitioned for integration in late 1975. Is that true? 
No, it isn't. The two UDT people who signed the 
petition in West Timor did not represent our party. In 
any case, all the four who signed the petition demanded 
certain conditions, but these conditions were never met, 
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so the petition is not valid. 
What are your views about East Timor's future? 
The Indonesians have asked Portugal to recognise 
integration, but Portugal cannot do this because this 
must be based on the w ii I of the people, and the people 
wi II never accept integration. After twelve years of 
political and military fighting against Indonesia, there 
con be no moral justification for Portugal to accept 
Indonesia's military takeover. 
What do you fee I about the recent statement by the 
Portuguese government, no longer mentioning the question 
of self-determination for East Timor? 
Although it sounds more ambiguous, I don't think the 
position of this government is any different from that of 
previous Portuguese governments because it soys that it 
wi II seek "on honorable solution". This con only mean a 
solution that is in accord with UN principles, as laid 
down in the UN Charter. Some people here in Portugal are 
trying to influence public opinion to press the 
government to accept integration, but we must fight 
against that. 
What do you think about the Portuguese journalist, Nuno 
Rocho whose articles strongly support integration? 
I know quite a lot about that but I cannot mention some 
of the things I know. Rocha believes Portugal wi 11 have 
to accept integration and he wants to reep some benefits. 
I believe Rocha knows the truth about conditions in East 
Timor but he only uses those bits that serve his purpose. 
You went to the UN this year for the meeting of the 
Fourth Committee. Was it the first time you went? 
No, I also went in 1980. This was the fourth time the 
UDT attended the Committee. Our party also attended in 
1979, 1980 and 1981. It is very important for small 
countries to have a forum where they can speak out 
against big countries. 
Your representative, Jooo Carroscoloo, said that people 
tried to silence him. Did he mean the Indonesians? 
Yes, the Indones ions lobbied hard in the corridors 
saying that, because the UDT signed the petition for 
integration, we have no right to speak against it. 
You were the UDT representative who signed the 
declaration of national convergence with Fretilin in 
Morch 1986. What ore your views about that? 
That document was very important a year ago but it is 
even more importC11t today. Already in 1985 and 1986, we 
saw that such a convergence would be important for the 
future. Recent developments in Portugal such as the more 
ambiguous position of the Portuguese government and the 
articles by Nuno Rocha give it even greater importance 
today. Such things could modify public opinion here in 
Portugal about East Timor. The convergence has mode it 
much easier for us to respond to Rocha's articles. 
How strong is the UDT inside East Timor? 
I think there is a great thirst among our people for 
liberty, for human dignity, for rights, greater freedom 
of expression, more access to economic activity, and 
social equality. We in UDT agree with all this. 
What solution does your party favour? 
We think the Portuguese should return to East Timor and 
resume control, so as to give the people time to prepare 
themselves for independence. We have asked the Portuguese 
government to do this. It is fully in accord with the UN 
Charter. Al I UN documents about East Timor recognise 
Portugal as the administering power. Portugal cannot 
seize this power in the face of Indonesian integration, 
but it can look for another solution. One solution is the 
Photograph by Elaine Briere. 
one I hove just mentioned. 
If Portugal does not do this but instead recognises 
integration, we should ask what benefit would that bring 
for Portugal, for the UN and for the East Timorese 
people. 
What does your party think about the political system in 
an independent East Timor? 
In our statement on notional convergence, we soy that 
there must be a parl iomentory system, that we must hove 
elections and proportional representation so as to ensure 
a position for oil parties in parliament. 
Do you think it's still true to say there are three 
parties in East Timor, Fretilin, the UDT and Apodeti? 
Yes. Indonesia gave more positions to the Apodeti. 
There is an old Apodeti and a new Apodeti. Those who, 
like us, have retained their nationalist sentiments hove 
suffered more than the new and the old Apodeti. These 
feelings hove remained very deep among our people. 
Yes, that is very striking, despite oil the sufferings 
they've gone through. Your people's struggle is like a 
beacon. Many people in Indonesia suffer grove injustices, 
and there is some struggle going on, but East Timor is 
I ike a beacon. 
Yes, the idea of resistance is very strong indeed in 
the minds of the people. 
What do you think about the armed resistance? 
I believe that this armed resistance will never end 
because oil the mountainous areas hove been depopulated 
so resistance fighters con wander around and the 
Indonesian army will never be able to find them. 
Do you agree that the armed struggle should continue? 
No, I don't, but if the Indonesians go on refusing to 
recognising our right to independence, then armed 
struggle is the only way. Anyone who surrenders is killed 
in spite of the presidential amnesty in 1982. It's not 
just that people ore fighting for independence, but 
because they know that if they surrender, they w i 11 be 
k i I led. 
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I think it would be much easier if the Indonesian 
government were to contribute to achieving such a 
solution. Indonesia is a great power in the region. 
Therefore, nothing can succeed in East Timor without the 
consent of the Indonesian government. But also, we know 
that Indonesia's only goal is the annexation of East 
Timor. Therefore, only if Indonesia changes its attitude 
will there be a solution in favour of self-determination 
and independence. 
How do you think that could happen? · 
One way is by international pressure. But that cannot 
happen if Portugal takes the position that they appear to 
be taking today. 
Also the role of international public opinion, the 
sol idor ity organisations, Amnesty lnternationo 1 and other 
human rights organisations, as well as the churches, is 
very important. There must be pressure for greater 
liberties inside the country, wider contacts between 
families. And I would aiso ask TAPOI- to continue to 
denounce Indonesian po 1 icy, and call for a proper 
solution. Until we reach a political solution, we must at 
least try to make some progress on human rights. 
(To Vincente Gutteres) When did you leave East Tlmor? 
I left in 1975, and later came to Lisbon with the help 
of the Portuguese government. My parents are in Baucau, a 
brother and a sister ore in the eastern port and another 
brother is studying at a seminary in Java. My family hos 
been lucky because no-one died during the war. Eight of 
them escaped to Atambuo during the conflict (between 
Freti tin and the UDT) in 1975. 
My father and brothers were arrested by Fret ii in in 
1975. Later during the invasion, some of the Fretilin 
Four ITS students held for questioning 
Four students of the Bandung Institute of Technology were 
held for questioning after a New Year's Eve cultural 
event. The arrests were announced by Lt-Col Syarwan 
Ham id, information chief of the West Java Regional 
Military Command. The evening was entitled: "1988, the 
year of jointly considering (menyimak) the dark clouds 
enveloping the country". He alleged that the event took 
place without permission. 
Although the evening was publicised as a musical event, 
he said, there had been speeches and poetry readings 
discrediting and insulting the head of state and other 
officials, and inciting people to carry out shows of 
feeling (unjuk raso) on the streets. Lt-Col Hamid said 
two had been allowed home but the others were undergoing 
"intensive interrogation" [Kompas, 13 January 1988]. 
Eleven Jehovah Witnesses arrested, 
including 'ex-PKiers' 
Eleven Jehovah Witnesses, including four married 
couples, have been arrested in East Java. Another 
fourteen are "under supervision". Some are likely to be 
formally charged for promoting "misleading" (sesat) 
religious teachings, in violation of a ban of the Jehovah 
Witnesses introduced in December 1976. Among those under 
arrest are persons (not clear whether one or more) said 
to be former members of the communist party. 
The sect is said to be very active in several East Java 
cities and to have spread to East Kolimontan. Since it 
operates 'illegally' and surreptitiously (sembunyi -
sembunyi) it has proved difficult for the security 
forces to flnd out how many people are involved [Surabaya 
INTERVIEW 
people wanted to k i 11 them but a friend managed to 
protect them, and they were to Id, "Each ooe must decided 
for him/herself what to do". 
(Moises do Amaral) In 1977, Nicolau Lobato (leader of 
Fret ii in who was murdered by the Indonesians in December 
1978) said that those people who were formerly Fretilin 
prisoners could join Fretilin; those who didn't wait to, 
could go and join the Indonesians. I must also soy that 
Indonesian propaganda which claims that many people died 
during the UDT-Fretilin conflict in 1975 is not true. The 
vast majority of deaths occurred from 1977 to 1979 
because of the bombing and from hunger and disease. In my 
region where there were so many casualities, there was no 
fighting at all between Fretilin and the UDT. 
(Vincente Gutteres) Even in Baucau, there was no 
fighting between the two parties. And when the Indonesian 
invasion occurred, this was a good opportunity for them 
to be united. 
It was Indonesian policy, wasn't it, to incite conflict 
between the UDT and Fretilin? 
(Moises do Amaral) Yes, indeed. Unfortunately, the 
Portuguese also tried to do this, by giving weapons to 
Fretilin. Had they wanted to, they could have stopped the 
fighting between the two parties. 
In his articles, Nuno Rocha soys that Fretilin were the 
killers, but who gave them the weapons? Herein lies the 
importance of the convergence - to show that, on our own, 
we have been able to reach an accord between our two 
parties, thus reaching a peaceful solution to our 
problem. * 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Post, 5 January 1988]. 
A senior Department of Religious Affairs official said 
that since their teachings were "radical", it was not 
surprising that ex-PK I people were attracted to it. He 
explained that while it was for his Deportment to 
investigate the teachings, it was for the Attorney-
General's office and the security forces to decide on 
action to be taken [Jowa Pos, 3 January 1988]. 
Younger generation must control ex-PK I 
Col. Alip Pandoyo, commander of Surokarta Sub-regional 
Mi Ii tary Command, has called on the younger generation to 
"control the mobility of PKI remnants". He said the 
region of Surakarta is "unsettled" (rawan) and is in need 
of constant vigilance because of the lasting threat of a 
communist revival. He quoted the PK I leader, Nyoto as 
saying "at the time of his trial in 1965" (sic) that 
communism would return to Indonesia after the 1945 
generation has left the scene [ Kedaulatan Rakyat, 16 
January 1988]. This is a downright 1 ie. Nyoto was never 
tried. He was murdered by soldiers on the day he was 
arrested in October 1965, as he was leaving a cabinet 
meeting at the presidential palace. 
Banjarmasin daily banned 
A long-established daily in Banjarmasin, South 
Kalimantan, Indonesia Merdeka, has been banned by the 
Department of Information for not having the 
necessary publishing permit, SIUPP. The paper dates 
back to 1945, the oldest daily in the country. The 
reason for the ban is unclear. The Department said 
only it applied for a SIUPP in 1985 but the permit 
was not granted [Suara Pembaruan, 30 November 1987]. 
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Compulsory transmigration 
0 
To what extent do the authorities rely on pressure and 
compulsion to fill their transmigration targets? The 
deepening poverty in Java is certainly the main 
'incentive' forcing people to leave for what they hope 
wil I be a better Ii fe in the outer isl ands. 
Now, as I and disputes throughout Java spread at on 
alarming rate, compulsory evictions are providing 
officials with the opportunity to force dispossessed 
peasants to tronsm igrote. This is most glaring I y apparent 
in the case of the thousands dispossessed by the Ke dung 
Ombo dam (see separate item). Other coses are less well 
documented, but from press reports it is possible to 
identify instances where people have been forced to leave 
home for on uncertain future as transmigrants. 
The urban poor as transm igrants 
F om ii ies in Semarang whose homes were described as 
"unsightly" (kumuh) and bui It without approval (liar) 
were ordered to vacate their homes by 1 October 1 967 and 
given no alternative accommodation or compensation. 
The city government left their rehousing to a Catholic 
agency, the Sugijopranota Social Foundation (YSS), one of 
the private foundations collaborating with the government 
to implement the transmigration programme. Soon ofter the 
families hod been evicted, YSS chairman, Br Servatius FIC 
said it would be wrong "to force them to transmigrate as 
this could be fatal" but they must speedily be "given the 
motivation to decide to go of their own volition" [Suaro 
Merdeka, 5 October 1987]. He said transmigration was "the 
only safe alternative"; if they returned to the villages 
whence they fled in search of a better I ife in the city, 
they would not be able to survive for long. This meant 
that the transmigration programme must be "intensified". 
Two months later, forty-nine families were setting out 
on the journey to Kumai in Central Kai imantan as non-
government-funded tronsmigrants (transmigran swakarso) 
with expences paid by the YSS. In their new home, they 
will occupy houses built for prospective transmigrants 
two years ago which have since stood vacant and ore 
certainly in a state of disrepair. One transmigration 
official welcomed the use of these vacant houses as it 
*i II mean saving state funds" [ Kompos, 12 December]. 
The inhabitants of 232 houses situated along a road in 
Semarang which was being widened for access to an 
amusement centre were ordered to vacate their homes and 
told that if they did not do so by the dead I ine, they 
would be driven out and their homes demolished along with 
the contents. They were low-paid factory workers, refuse 
collectors, parking attendants and street .vendors with no 
funds to buy a house or trove I anywhere. But they were 
offered no compensot ion as they were 'squatters'. They 
hod in fact paid for the land but had no documents to 
prove it. Most had come to Semarang years ago from the 
surrounding countryside and hod nowhere to go. So when 
local officials including people from the transmigration 
office "gave them guidance" about their future, there was 
I ittle they could do but accept the offer of 
transmigration [Suora Merdeko, 11 June 1987]. 
The urban poor ore classified by acronyms. The crudest 
term now used is 'gepeng', abbreviated from gelandongon 
(vagrants) and pengemis (beggars). The word 'gepeng' 
also means 'flattened'. 'PGOT' (for pengem is, gelondangan 
don orang terlantar or beggars, vagrants and homeless) is 
another term by which the urban poor are now known. 
According to the authorities in Central Java, 214 
'gepeng' fami I ies were tronsm igrated from the province in 
1966/67 [ Kedaulaton Rakyat, 6 November 1987]. Yet it is 
well known that the urban poor do not toke to being 
transmigrants. One group from Jakarta who were 
transmigrated to a site along the River Merdeko in East 
Kolimonton hove almost oil left the site, having first 
stolen a march on the authorities by selling off their 
homes and plots to business interests in Bolikpapon. 
Meanwhile, families who mode their homes along railway 
tracks in several ports of Jakarta hove been evicted to 
make way for the tracks to be widened. The number of 
fom iii es involved is not clear but they hove oil been 
told, after 'consultations', to transmigrate. Fifteen of 
the families were recently dispatched too site in South 
Sumatra [Merdeka, 6 October 1967]. 
From Surabaya comes a report that four hundred urban 
poor families, some living along railway tracks others 
with homes in kampungs, and others Ii ving on the 
1
streets, 
w~re ordered by the city government to transmigrate. In 
this case however, the transmigration authorities hove so 
far failed to provide sites, leaving the families 
uncertain about their future two years after being 
ordered to leave [Surabaya Post, 5 December 1967].* 
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Dam victims forced to transmigrate 
In mid-Decerrber, fifty families from Genangsari, Ngrakum 
and Wonoharjo villages in the district of Boyolali, 
Central Java were bundled onto buses with all their 
personal possessions, and sent to South Sumatra to "start 
a new life" as tronsmigrants. Many were weeping. 
Presiding over the departure was Lieutenant-Colonel 
Mohammad Hasbi, Boyolal i district head and former 
commander of the Jogjakarta garrison who, more than any 
other official, has been responsible for hounding the 
villagers in their efforts to resist dispossession and 
enforced transmigration. Hasbi advised the departing 
families to adjust speedily to their new surroundings and 
follow diligently the orders of their superiors. 
"Wherever we ore," he said generously, "we must obey the 
regulations if we want to live a quiet life." [Suaro 
Merdeka, 17 December 1987] 
Of the 1 ,854 fam ii ies in Boyolali . targetted for 
transmigration, 1, 160 have already left while the 
remainder will reportedly soon follow. 
Altogether, 3, 236 fam i I ies have been sent away as 
transmigrants from the districts of Boyolali, Sragen and 
Grobogan. Another 1,259 families are to be transmigrated; 
the delay is said to be due to lack of funds for moving 
sponsored transmigrants [Suara Merdeka, 30 December]. 
Boyolali: A campaign of intimidation 
and harassment 
The long-drawn-out struggle of Boyolali peasants to 
resist dispossession has been widely reported in the 
press [see TAPOL Bulletins, Nos 82, 83 and 84]. Documents 
have become available revealing systematic intimidation 
against villagers whose land has been seized for the dam. 
Stiffest resistance has come from peasants living in a 
dozen or so villages in sub-district Kemusu, Boyolali 
district. Of the 2,654 families who were told to move, 
only thirty per cent accepted the pitiful compensation 
offered by the provincial government without a fight. 
Significantly, these were civil servants, village 
officials and alleged former members of outlawed 
organisations, all of whom have apparently since moved 
away or been transmigrated to other parts. 
From the documents, we now know that pressure on the 
peasants began way back in 1982 when the Kedung Ombo dam 
was still at the planning stage. After a series of bitter 
experiences, the Boyolal i peasants, with the help of a 
legal aid institute and other NGOs in Solo, organised 
meetings in late 1985 to discuss their rights as citizens 
and decided to make a stand. 
Chronology of trouble 
One document is a chronology of events from 1982 to 
September 1986. Before the general elections in 1982, the 
inhabitants had been told that, if they voted for Golkar, 
no-one would be driven off their land for the dam, but if 
Golkar lost, access to nearby forests would be stopped. 
Fearing that their land rights were in jeopardy, many 
peasants applied in 1984 for land-right certificates. The 
fees were paid but the certificates were never issued. 
The following year, local officials made surveys of the 
A shot of the River Serang, the river that will supply 
water to the Kedung Ombo dam. 
land in Kemusu but the villagers refused to counter-sign 
the survey reports, fearing that their thumb-prints would 
be used as proof that they agreed to the compensation 
being offered for their land. Officials claimed that 
confirming surveys did not imply accepting the rates of 
compensation, but resistance to the surveys continued. 
In January 1986, villagers were ordered to attend a 
meeting with local government leaders to 'be given 
guidance'. Anyone failing to attend would face sanctions 
under Article 224 of the Penal Code. This meeting was 
convened primarily to order members of outlawed 
organisations to thumb-print land surveys and leave the 
region as transmigrants. However, not all the people at 
the meeting were former members of outlawed 
organisations. While former members agreed to sign (they 
could hardly have refused), the others refused. Later 
that month those who had refused were again summoned, 
this time by koramil, the local military command, and 
ordered to thumb-print the surveys. They sti 11 refused. 
In February, other villagers were summoned to meetings 
and again put under pressure. 
Two months later, the former members of outlawed 
organisations were again summoned and confronted by an 
array of high-ranking local civilian and military 
officials who gave them two days to register for 
transmigration to Nabire (West Papua). Anyone failing to 
do so would be confined within their village boundaries. 
Seventeen people attending this meeting had not been 
members of outlawed organisations but they later 
discovered that their identity cards were marked with the 
letters ET (for 'ex-tapol) implying that they were. 
From then on, summonses to meetings became a regular 
form of intimidation. At one such meeting for Kemusu 
villagers on 30 April, they were given a lecture about 
outlawed organisations. On 1 May, the villagers of 
Ngrokum village were summoned to a meeting, the third to 
be held in their village, and advised to transmigrate. 
(These villagers are among those who eventually left in 
December 1987: see above.) From 6 Moy, villagers in 
Genengsari village were summoned in groups of ten to a 
series of daily meetings at which they were ordered to 
thumb-print documents. Many refused, asking for 
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consultations about the rate of compensation. 
On 17 July, the Kemusu village head wrote to his sub-
district chief complaining that several villagers, 
including a man named Jaswadi, were "spreading 
disaffection". A week later, on 23 July, a number of 
inhabitants in the sub-district of Nglanji formally 
complained to the police c:hout malpractices regarding the 
payment of compensation; some had received less than 
half the amoui t promised, while others who had not agreed 
to accept compensation had nevertheless been forced to 
accept money. 
Then on 5 August, the Semarang daily, Suara Merdeka, a 
Golkar paper, accused "elements" in Boyolal i of "trying 
to corner their village heads" by refusing to sign 
compensation agreements and demanding to have their land 
certificates. Four days later, Jaswadi of Nglanji village 
was detained for the night and questioned by several 
local officials about the complaints made to the police. 
Fol lowing a supportive local journalist's report later 
that month, Suara Merdeka again attacked the villagers, 
especially Joswodi, accusing them of retarding 
development activities. On the some day, villagers sought 
the help of the Legal Aid Institute in Jogjakarta, and a 
day later, Suara Merdeka warned that "certain elements" 
were trying to politicise the dam dispute. The LBH took 
immediate action on the villagers' behalf. Then on 6 
September, Joswodi was again summoned and told that legal 
proceedings were being taken against him. [The Chronology 
ends at this point.] 
Methods used to seize land 
Another document doted 17 February 1987 describes 
official moves to take over the land needed for the 
KedungOmbodam. The land acquisition team of government 
officials and project managers: 
* never consu I ted the inhobi tants about either collection 
of data (surveying) or fixing the rote of compensation, 
* intimidated inhabitants who were not willing to accept 
com pen sat ion, 
* branded people as members of out! awed organisations, 
* falsified people's signatures or thumb-prints on 
documents accepting compensation, 
* mode it difficult for people to obtain documents needed 
for various purposes, 
* exerted pressure on people to agree to transmigrate, 
* promised that people willing to accept compensation 
would be transmigrated at the government's expence but 
then charged them Rp. 220,000 a family when they left, 
* arrested people on trumped-up charges, 
* circulated inaccurate information to confuse people. 
The villagers are not opposed to the dam being bui It, 
the document continues. But what they do object to ore 
the Team's way of seizing land. Most villagers in Kemusu 
sub-district were unwilling to accept cash compensation 
and wonted other land near the dam instead. Land surveys 
were rejected because there had been no consultation. 
Terror and intimidation 
The Jakarta doi ly,Suara Pembaruon reported on 24 July 
1987 that dozens of vi 11 agers in several sub-districts of 
Boyolal i had been arrested and held by the local police 
or military for refusing to accept government offers of 
compensation. A policeman had held the thumb of one 
elderly man and forced him to put his thumb-print on a 
document the contents of which were unknown to him. 
With such coersion to persuade villagers to attend 
meetings with officials, there was widespread fear, 
causing people to flee from their homes md toke shelter 
in nearby forests. Faced with strong pressure to 
transmigrate, many men said their wives were so 
vehemently opposed that they feared transmigration would 
lead to a spate of divorces. Their dislike for 
transmigration was based on the bod reports about 
transmigration sites where former neighbours were now 
living. They insisted that they would only be satisfied 
with land-for-land compensation. * 
Workshop on Kedung Ombo dam cancelled 
A workshop on the Kedung Ombo dam project convened by 
the Jogjakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH) at Gajoh 
Mada University campus was "indefinitely postponed" 
on the orders of the Jogjakarta pol ice. 
The panel of speakers included well-known experts 
on environmental problems and land rights including 
Dr Loekman Soetrisno, Dr. Nico L. Kana, Professor 
Otto Soemarwoto and representatives from WALH I, the 
Indonesian Environmental Forum and the LBH. Many 
Indonesian NGOs had been invited as well as the World 
Bank and the district heads of Sragen and Boyolali. 
LBH officials running the workshop said they did 
not apply for police permission because the workshop 
was to have been an academic discussion held in 
cooperation with Gajoh Mada University. [ Kedaulatan 
Rakyat, 31 October 1987, reported in Indonesia News 
Service, No 49, 18 November 1987.] 
The decision to prevent the workshop shows how 
sensitive the authorities are about any discussion of 
the issues raised by dam construction. 
Sragen 
In Srogen, another of the districts affected by the dam, 
the local authorities have managed to impose their will 
through intimidation, assisted by what appears to be a 
local kebotinon (Javanese mystics) organisation. 
In Soka, Miri sub-district, where land sells for around 
Rp. 5,000 per square meter, 229 fam ii ies rejected the 
government's offer of Rp. 750 (now further reduced to Rp 
730). Ten of them were chosen to make representations to 
the second-leval regional assembly and to ask the LBH to 
fight their case. But nine were summoned by the Srogen 
pol ice and questioned about their backgrounds. Then, the 
peasants were put in touch with an organisation called 
Sarona Duta Perdamaion Indonesia (Sadupi), possibly a 
kebotinan organisation promoting conflict resolution. It 
was not long before Sadupi hod persuaded the peasants to 
accept the money on offer and agree to transm igrote, a 
complete climb-down. The only 'concession' from Sodupi 
was a promise to press for the rehabilitation of the nine 
men who had been branded as 'extremists' and on 
undertaking from the police to stop investigating their 
backgrounds [ Kompas, 28 December 1987]. * 
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Dayaks ruined by plantation 
economy 
The following is a slightly abridged translation of an article in Kompas, on 27December1987, describing the impact of a 
Nucleus Estate (PIR)projectin Central Kalimantanon what was once a thriving Dayak community. The item is unusual, in 
the current extensive reporting on transmigration failures, because it focusses on the bitter experiences of the local, 
tribal people. 
The inhabitants of Dusun Tengah sub-district used to live 
a tranquil and peaceful life. Up to mid-1981 when the 
South Bari to district government (Central Kol imantan) and 
PTP XVIII started investigating the possibility of 
setting up a Special Nucleus Estate (PIR-Khusus) project 
in the area, living conditions were fine. 
But in 1982 and 1983, the PIR project run by PTP XVIII 
began to operate. The inhabitants were told by the local 
government that their land would be affected by the 
project and they should be conscious (dim into kesadaran) 
of the need to give up their land voluntarily, in the 
interests of the project, along with and all their 
standing crops. 
It wasn't difficult to persuade the Manyan tribespeople 
to agree even though they surrendered their land by 
signing empty sheets of paper. Altogether at least 229 
family-heads in the villages of Ulu Sewu, Ulu Jamon, 
Gagutar, Agung Sayu, Batuah and Baruyan "contributed''") 
land to the project. 
.. .. .. 
Not long afterwards, anxieties began to plague the 
villagers. "We were promised that if we handed over our 
land, at least two persons per family would be employed 
by PIR as day-labourers and get Rp. 2,500 a day. In fact, 
only the family-head wos allowed to work and the wage was 
Rp 1,200 a day," said Agepson, 38, who had allowed his 
one hectare of rubber and fruit trees to be mowed down by 
the tractor. For four years, the families tried surviving 
on Rp. 1,200 a day. "It was a bitter disappointment," 
said Ki Ion, 34, whose 1.5 hectares of rubber and durian 
trees were turned as if by magic (disulap) into PIR land. 
They are also bitter about the terms of participation 
in the project. "Is it not the limit for us now to be in 
debt to PIR, considering that the land they use is our 
ancestral land which was previously our main source of 
livelihood?' complained lndin, 48, head of the Manyan 
tribal council, whose three hectares of rubber trees were 
"gobbled up" (dimangsa) by the project. 
This is why most of the families do not want to live in 
the houses provided and have refused to join up as 
participants; of the 229 families, only 27 have joined. 
"We've already made our contribution to the government," 
said Kilon bitterly. 
"Of course, the PIR project has brought benefits but 
for the villagers, these are out-weighep by the damage 
we've suffered," said Boger Sugan, 50, head of Gagutar 
village. The region has benefited from the creation of 
job opportunities with many newcomers [ transm igrants] 
arriving to work as day-labourers. But against this, the 
rubber and other crops cultivated for so many years at 
considerable cost have simply been expropriated. "That's 
what we I ived from for generations, giving us Dayaks 
prosperity," he said. 
*) The quotation marks around this and several other 
single words are retained from the original, giving the 
word a tinge of irony. Longer quotes are remarks made by 
villagers. 
As things got worse, people had to cut short their 
children's education or not give them any schooling at 
all. Formerly some families were able to send their kids 
to school in Palangkaraya, 265 kms to the east in Central 
Kalimantan or to Banjarmasin, 385 kms to the west in 
South Kalimantan. "It's not just that we can't give our 
children an education any more; it's even hard to feed 
the family on Rp. 1,200 a day," said Kutin. To make 
matters worse, other sources of income have dried up. 
.. .. .. 
Before the project came, the entire sub-district was 
covered by small-holders rubber-trees and fruit orchards. 
People could tap 10 to 15 kilos of rubber a day at Rp. 
200 to 300 a kilo. Since the 1987 devaluation, the rubber 
price has risen to Rp 900 a kilo and fruit prices have 
risen as well. They harvested fruit every ten months. 
In the project, there has been confusion over the 
allocation of rubber-tree stands so that participants do 
not know what their rights and responsibilities are. In 
the plasma part of the project, tree maintenance is 
confined to strips along the road or around the plasma 
office in Vi II age 3. Trees located further in have been 
left to wither and are over-run by weeds. But things are 
very different in the nucleus part of the project, giving 
the impression that funds to care for trees in the plasma 
areas have been cut to the bone. There may we 11 have been 
leaks, yet even so, everything worked on by the 
participants has to be paid for in their credit-packet 
and repaid to the company. 
Of the 22,000 hectares planned, as yet only 1,000 
hectares for the nucleus and 2,000 hectares for the 
plasma have been planted. After five years, there is 
.still no sign of a new life of prosperity. One of the 
project foremen, Tamberin, 32, admits that few of the 850 
family-heads working for the project expect it to bring 
them a decent 1 iving. Almost every day, people leave to 
find work elsewhere. "So far, 70 people have left," he 
said. 
He was once asked to find ten day-labourers but in 
actual fact, only eight workers were needed; the other 
two wages were fictional and went into someone's private 
purse. Because he objected to such goings-on, Tamberin 
has since been prevented from doing overtime. 
* * * 
The sub-district area secretary (sekwilcam), Derlin, 
regards the anxieties of the villagers as natural. Any 
large-scale project affecting many people is bound to 
have its victims. "That happens everywhere," he said. 
According to Derlin, no promises were made by local 
government officials when the land was . surrendered. Nor 
was anyone forced; everything was left to people's 
consciousness. "If they didn't want to give up their 
land, that was that," he said. 
The economic difficulties were also described by Derl in 
as natural. "I'm sure that if they stay with the project 
until the rubber-trees are six or seven years old, their 
income could reach $1,500 a year as planned." he so id. 
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Villagers sue government 
for wrongful arrest 
Four villagers from Kertaharja Cimerak village in the 
district of Ciamis, West Java who each spent a total of 
235 days in detention without charge in 1984 are suing 
the government for wrongful arrest. The men are being 
A shot of part of the plasma area of the PIR project in 
Cimerak, West Java. 
asssisted in their action by Amartiwi Saleh of the 
Bandung Legal Aid Institute . 
The four men were holding a discussion in a mosque 
about a government decision to use their land for a 
nucleus estate when the village head entered the mosque 
and told them that any gathering of more than three 
persons was illegal. He ordered them all to leave. The 
villagers refused to obey so the village head pulled out 
a pistol ahd forced them to disperse. 
Later they were al I arrested and he Id for more than 
eight months unti I a high court decided that they were 
al I innocent and should be released. [Jakarta Post, 20 
November 1987) 
[For an account of the nucleus estate project in 
Cimerak, which is probably the project they were 
discussing, see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 83, October 1987.) 
Peasants flee from officials 
More than a hundred peasants who protested about the sole 
without their consent of their land by the village chief, 
fled from their villages ofter receiving threats from 
village officials. 
The 113 peasants are from Aek Korsik in Aek sub-
district, Labuhan Batu district, North Sumatra. They were 
protesting against a deal struck as long ago as 1980 by 
the village chief to sell 450 hectares of land to three 
businessmen in Rantauprat. 
The peasants insisted that the land, formerly belonging 
to the forestry department, was legitimately theirs, 
having been given to them by local officials in 1972. Six 
years later they obtained land certificates, confirming 
their ownership. However, the village chief sold the land 
to businessmen, claiming that the peasants had failed to 
cultivate the land properly and it could be put to better 
use if sold to the businessmen. In fact, the land had 
been in constant cultivation since the owners acquired it 
fifteen years ago. 
After foiling to get the sale reversed, a peasant named 
Pandeman Panjaiton was delegated to go to Jakarta to make 
representations to parliament. Members of parliament gave 
him a letter to deliver to the governor of North Sumatra, 
but when he delivered the letter, police seized him and 
he was held for five days. It was ofter this incident 
that the other peasants involved in the dispute felt 
threatened and decided to flee their village for safety. 
[Jakarta Post, 31 October 1987] 
Death-sentence prisoner dies after 22 
years in prison 
Sergeant Raswad, one of the many political prisoners held 
since 1965, who was sentenced to death for his alleged 
role in the kidnap of members of the Indonesian general 
staff on 1 October 1965, died in custody in early 
November 1987. He was 67 years old. 
He had been suffering from tuberculosis for many years, 
and died in the hospital wing of Cipinang Prison shortly 
after his lung started to haemorrhage. 
Raswad was a merrber of the Cakrabirawa Palace Guard at 
the ti me of his arrest on 5 October 1965. He was tried by 
the Jakarta Military Tribunal in 1968 and given a death 
sentence on t 6 April of that year. It was once reported 
that he had made a plea for clemency to the president 
but nothing was ever heard about the resu Its. 
Friends of the family say that the execution of many 
long-term political prisoners in 1985 and 1986 came as a 
great shock to him and seriously aggravated his health. 
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